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N this Article the procedural problems likely to be encountered in the trial
of an antitrust suit are discussed, with citations to many of the relevant
authorities. In addition to general considerations and certain pre-trial mo-
tions the following topics are covered: parties; standing; real party in inter-
est; capacity; subject matter and personal jurisdiction; pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction; exemptions from antitrust coverage; regulated industries; serv-
ice of process; venue; nationwide service of process under the Clayton Act;
pleadings; discovery; class actions; and multi-district litigation.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Immateriality of Amount in Controversy. Although it is generally under-
stood that antitrust suits are not subject to an amount of money in con-
troversy requirement and also are not dependent upon diversity of citizen-
ship, it may nevertheless be helpful to set out the sources of this state of the
law. Section 1337 of United States Code title 28 provides: "[T]he district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding
arising under an Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade
and commerce against restraints and monopolies."' Interpreting the key
phrase "arising under an Act. . . regulating commerce" to include antitrust
actions, the Supreme Court, in a leading case, has held that no jurisdictional
amount of money in controversy requirement exists as to antitrust cases. 2
Similarly, the normal requirement that there be diversity of citizenship
before there is federal jurisdiction has been held inapplicable to antitrust
actions.
Immateriality of Diversity of Citizenship. Section 1331 of title 28 provides
that "[T]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interests and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States." 3 Except for the requirement as to the amount
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970).
2. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The Supreme Court stated that it was of the
"opinion that as the complaint assails the validity of the program under the antitrust laws, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-33, the suit is one 'arising under' a 'law regulating commerce'; and allegation and
proof of the jurisdictional amount are not required." Id. at 349.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
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in controversy, section 1331 and section 1337 apply the same test in deter-
mining whether the case "arises under" federal law.'
In Coast v. Hunt Oil Co.5 it was argued that joining a person as a party
defendant deprives a federal court of jurisdiction when both the desired
party defendant and the plaintiff are citizens of the same state. The court,
however, held that "where the action is for the enforcement of rights arising
under or created by a federal statute such as the Anti-Trust Act, the court
has jurisdiction regardless of the citizenship of the parties .... ."6 Recog-
nizing that the preceding jurisdictional requirements are immaterial in anti-
trust cases, this Article proceeds only to analyze and discuss the juris-
dictional factors of parties to the suit, the different types of federal juris-
diction, venue, service of process, and the pleading requirements.
II. PARTIES
Standing to Maintain Action. Although much has been written about
"standing" under the federal antitrust statutes, the Supreme Court of the
United States first directed its attention to this issue only as late as 1968 in
the noted case of Flast v. Cohen.7 In Flast and thereafter, in short order, in
four additional cases 8 the Court determined that the first element which
must be met for a plaintiff to establish standing to maintain an antitrust
action is an allegation and demonstration that the plaintiff has suffered a
wrong. This requirement is derived from article III of the Constitution which
restricts the exercise of judicial power to "cases" and "controversies."
Therefore, the plaintiff's allegation and demonstration of a wrong, econom-
ic or otherwise, must show that he has some personal stake in the outcome
of the litigation. Standing does not contemplate what a plaintiff's legally
protected interests may be on the merits or whether the controversy is
otherwise justiciable, but only "whether the person whose standing is chal-
lenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue." 9
The second element necessary to afford standing to bring an antitrust
action is determined by "whether the interest sought to be protected by the
complainant is arguably within the zone of interests sought to be protected
or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."' 0 This
4. Federal Coast Ry. v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 328 F.2d 720 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 830 (1964).
5. 96 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. La. 1951), aff'd, 195 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
836 (1952).
6. 96 F. Supp. at 61.
7. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
8. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev., 97 S. Ct. 555, 50 L. Ed. 2d
450 (1977) (where standing concept approved); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Barlow v.
Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data Processing Servs. Organization, Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970). The Supreme Court in Warth v. Seldin, supra, held that a homebuilders
association lacked capacity to sue and recover money damages on behalf of its members. The
Court stated, however, that a trade association could have standing as the representative of its
members even in the absence of injury to itself where it alleged that its members were suffering,
or threatened with, injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out ajusticiable case had the members themselves been parties to the suit. The Supreme Court
further said that the association must show that "[t]he nature of the claim and of the relief
sought does not make the individual participation of each injured party indispensable to the
proper resolution of the cause." 422 U.S. at 511.
9. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968).
10. Association of Data Processing Servs. Organization, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
19771
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"zone of interest" test was designed to replace the "legal right" test. The
flaw of the legal right test is that it goes to the merits of the case rather than
to the preliminary issue of standing."I In the recent Supreme Court case of
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois12 the Court held that section 4 of the Clayton Act
affords a remedy only to persons who purchase directly from the antitrust
offender. Proposed legislation in the aftermath of Illinois Brick would
amend the Clayton Act by adding a new section 41 which would state in
effect that in any action under § 4A or 4C the fact that a person or the United
States was an indirect purchaser would not bar recovery. The congressional
purpose in enacting such legislation, if it is passed, would be to provide
consumer protection.
The lower federal courts have also discussed standing to maintain an
antitrust action, with such discussions being keyed to the language of sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act.' 3 That section declares the right of private parties
to maintain an action for damages because of violations of antitrust statutes
as follows: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any
district court of the United States . . . and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained . . .,14
Although the lower courts are talking about the same "standing" that the
Supreme Court is, sometimes the elements have been stated somewhat
differently. Standing under section 4 has been held to encompass two
ingredients: (i) that the plaintiff's interest which is allegedly injured by the
defendant falls within the scope of antitrust protection, and (ii) that the
defendant's conduct contributed to the plaintiff's injuries.' 5 The two criteria
to be satisfied before standing is established for a private antitrust suit under
section 4 were stated a little differently in Southern Concrete Co. v. United
States Steel Corp. 16 In Southern Concrete the criteria were stated to be: (i)
the plaintiff must show that he has suffered injury to his business or
property; and (ii) the plaintiff must show that his injuries were incurred by
reason of the defendant's illegal activities.'
Relief in a private action under the antitrust laws cannot, therefore, arise
merely from the existence of an antitrust violation. The "gist of the action
• . . is damage to the individual plaintiff resulting proximately from the acts
of the defendant which constitute a violation of the law.'9 8 Additionally, the
(1970). In this case appears Justice Douglas' often-quoted dictum that "[g]eneralizations about
standing to sue are largely worthless as such." Id. at 151.
II. Davis v. Romney, 355 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Pa. 1973), modified, 490 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir.
1974), aff'd, 530 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1975).
12. 45 U.S.L.W. 4611 (U.S. June 9, 1977). See also Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat, Inc., 45 U.S.L.W. 4138 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1977).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). See also Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa Corp., No. C-LV 76-77
S.C. (D. Nev. May 23, 1977). Summa held that section 4 of the Clayton Act does not provide a
publisher standing to sue under section 1 of the Sherman Act nor under section 8 of the Clayton
Act. The court stated that the injury found under the circumstances was not the kind of injury
which the antitrust laws were designed to protect.
14. Id.
15. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), on remand, 367 F.
Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd, 538 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1976).
16. 394 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Ga. 1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1976).
17. Id. at 368.
18. Association of W. Rys. v. Riss & Co., 299 F.2d 133, 135 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370
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following language by the Second Circuit gives a cogent example of the
federal judicial reasoning behind the standing requirement:
Standing to sue (under Section IV of the Clayton Act) was not given by
Congress to any and every citizen who, motivated by public spirit or
possibly some baser reason, would set himself up as a watchdog of
business behavior. Congress properly bestowed the right to sue only on
such persons as might be injured in their business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws. 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that for
standing to exist in a suit charging antitrust violations plaintiff must demon-
strate (i) that injury was caused to his business or property, and (ii) that such
injury was the result of defendant's illegal activities.20 Also, in a recent case
the court held that a condominium corporation itself had no standing to bring
the action, even under the broader Clayton Act section providing for injunc-
tive relief. 2' Instead, the court held that the required causal connection
between the antitrust violation and the injury could exist only with respect
to purchasers of the condominium units, not the condominium corporation
from which the purchasers had bought their units. This was a case brought
against developers of the condominium complex under the first and second
sections of the Sherman Act and under the treble damages section of the
Clayton Act.2 2 In the complaint it was alleged that the "tying products"
were the residential condominium units and the "tied products '2 3 were the
recreational facilities and obligations to make rental payments thereon.
Standing to sue in favor of Ralph Nader was found recently by a trial
court in a case brought to enjoin allegedly anticompetitive overbooking
practices -of numerous airlines. 24 The court ruled that Nade7 did not seek
merely to vindicate the public interest but had alleged "concrete and par-
ticularized personal injuries arising from the alleged antitrust violation." 2 5
The cause was dismissed, however, under the doctrine of primary juris-
diction.
Among the classes of persons which courts have held not to have standing
to sue under the federal antitrust statutes are the following: employees of an
injured corporation;2 6 creditors of an injured corporation; 27 and persons
suffering merely incidental injury, thus placing them outside the target area
of a price-fixing conspiracy or other antitrust violation.
2 8
U.S. 916 (1962). See also Shumate & Co. v. National Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., 509 F.2d 147
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
19. SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 407 F.2d 166, 171 (2d Cir. 1969).
20. Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1110 (1975).
21. Buckley Towers Condominium, Inc. v. Buchwald, 533 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1976).
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 15 (1970).
23. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969), and
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), for a discussion of "tied"
and "tying" products.
24. Nader v. Air Transp. Ass'n of America, 426 F. Supp. 1035 (D.D.C. 1977).
25. Id. at 1038.
26. Ragar v. T.J. Raney & Sons, 388 F. Supp. 1184, 1186 (E.D. Ark.), aff'd, 521 F.2d 795
(8th Cir. 1975).
27. Id.
28. Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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In mid-April 1977 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pfizer, Inc. v.
Government of India29 to consider whether foreign governments, claiming to
have been injured by Sherman Act violations, have standing to sue in
American courts for treble damages. Section IV of the Clayton Act provides
that "any person" may sue for treble the amount of damages caused that
person by violation of the antitrust laws. 30 Section I of the Act defines
'persons" to include corporations and associations existing under domestic
or foreign laws, but says nothing about governments, either domestic or
foreign.3 1 The Supreme Court has held that the Government of the United
States is not a "person" entitled to sue for treble damages. 32 On the other
hand, a state does have standing to maintain suit. 33
As is well known to lawyers working in the antitrust field, many states,
private parties, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Justice Department
have all maintained lengthy antitrust litigation against American manufac-
turers of the antibiotic Tetracycline, charging the defendant companies had
conspired to monopolize trade, and, thus, had inflated the price of this
widely used drug. Now various foreign governments have brought actions.
In May 1976 the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court decision that the
governments of India, Iran, and the Philippines are "persons" entitled to
sue for treble damages. 34
Real Party in Interest. The real party in interest rule, derived from Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) 35 dictates that all actions, to be valid, must be
29. 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3960 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1977).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
31. Id. § 12.
32. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941).
33. Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
34. The reasoning of the appellate court was that since Congress intended domestic state
governments to have standing to sue for antitrust violations, in view of the Supreme Court
decision in Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942), then "Congress intended other bodies
politic, such as a foreign government, to enjoy the same right. There is certainly no indication
of a contrary intent in the legislative history." Such reasoning was upheld by the Eighth Circuit
sitting en banc. 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3960 (U.S. Apr. 19,
1977). The Supreme Court then sought the Solicitor General's view of the petition submitted by
the drug manufacturing companies to review the said Eighth Circuit decision. In reply the
Justice Department stated that the petition for writ of the defendant companies should be
denied. The Department of State apparently supported this position by making known its view
that it anticipated no foreign policy problems would arise from allowing foreign governments to
sue under American antitrust laws. But the drug manufacturers claimed in their application for
writ that foreign countries have already reaped vast profits from trade combinations such as
OPEC and would be very happy to let American courts award them "further chunks" of the
American economy as damages. Many foreign countries are today arrayed in trade combina-
tions conflicting with the philosophy of the antitrust laws, which combinations our country has
been powerless to prevent. Therefore, the defendant companies urged that if the decision is
made to accord standing to such foreign countries to sue in American courts for antitrust
violations, such a decision should be made in the first instance by congressional enactment.
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) provides, in part, that:
Every action should be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An
executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party
with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of
another, or a party authorized by statute, may sue in his own name without
joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought . . . . No
action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest until reasonable time has been allowed after objection
for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of,
the real party in interest . ...
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prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. This rule was originally
intended merely to allow an assignee to sue in his own name; it has,
however, also come to protect a defendant against subsequent action by the
party actually entitled to recovery and thus insures that a judgment will have
the proper degree of finality. 36 For example, a defendant's motion to dismiss
an antitrust action by a trade association alleging violations of the Sherman
Act in connection with the retail sale of gravestones was granted in Northern
California Monument Dealers Association v. Interment Association,37 in
which the court said: "As a trade association whose members have allegedly
been damaged by violations of the antitrust laws, plaintiff does not itself
have any right to relief for a cause of action, since the association is not the
'real party in interest.' "38 The court in the Interment Association case could
as easily have said that the Association lacked standing to sue. Had oppos-
ing counsel relied on standing, great consternation would have been caused
since standing is not always as well understood and tends to be a confusing
concept. Most lawyers, however, are at ease with their understanding of real
party in interest terminology.
Capacity. Capacity has been defined as "not only the power to bring an
action, but also the power to maintain it." 39 A good example of the concept
of capacity is the United States Court of Claim's holding that a plaintiff
corporation had the capacity to bring suit but lost that capacity when it was
suspended, under state law, for failing to pay its taxes some twenty days
after the complaint had been filed.'
Some confusion has existed in the cases between the related concepts of
standing, real party in interest, and capacity to sue and be sued. As seen
heretofore, standing is a preliminary inquiry of court, not to be judged from
the standpoint of the likely outcome of proof following trial on the merits;
rather, the question is whether a plaintiff has alleged and is likely to demon-
strate that he has sustained a wrong and has a personal stake in the litigation.
Further, the wrong suffered must be within the zone of interest sought to be
protected or regulated by the antitrust statutes. Finally, the plaintiff must
show, under section 4 of the Clayton Act, that the injuries sustained to his
business were incurred by reason of defendant's illegal activities. The real
party in interest principle serves to identify the person who possesses the
right sought to be enforced. This concept directs attention to whether the
plaintiff has a significant interest in the particular action he has instituted.4'
Capacity is conceived to be a party's personal right to litigate in a federal
court. This issue is supposed to be determined under rule 17(b) and (c) 42 for
all parties to the suit. It is not limited to the plaintiff, as is the real party in
interest concept, nor is it dependent upon the character of the specific claim
36. White Hall Bldg. Corp. v. Profexray Div. of Litton Indus., Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1202
(E.D. Pa. 1974).
37. 120 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
38. Id. at 94.
39. Mather Constr. Co. v. United States, 475 F.2d 1152 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
40. Id.
41. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1542, at 639 (1971).
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b), (c).
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involved in the litigation. A real party in interest may lack capacity to sue
because he has become mentally incompetent or is an infant. Or, a plaintiff
may have capacity to sue but, if he has assigned all his interest in the claim,
may no longer be the real party in interest.43 Naturally, a plaintiff may be the
real party in interest possessing the right sought to be enforced, and may
have capacity to sue, not being under any legal disabilities, and, yet, may not
have standing because he is outside the zone of interest sought to be
protected by the antitrust statutes.
The interrelated concepts of standing, real party in interest, and capacity
have been dealt with by courts in a variety of different areas. Often litigated
are disputes over whether the following types of relationships between
parties either confer standing or capacity on the named plaintiff, or make
him the real party in interest: powers of attorney; proxies; trade associa-
tions; assignees; and trustees. For example, a naked power of attorney for
the purpose of investigating or prosecuting an antitrust action cannot in
itself confer standing to sue on the attorney in fact." Similarly, proxies,
appointed for the purpose of litigation only, are not effective to enable the
holder to bring an antitrust suit "either as a real party in interest or as a
trustee of an express trust. ' 45
In a situation involving a trade association the Supreme Court, in Warth v.
Seldin, 6 affirmed dismissal of an action by Homebuilders Association
which had sought to recover money damages on behalf of its members,
holding that:
Homebuilders alleges no monetary injury to itself, nor any assign-
ment of the damage claims of its members. No award therefore can be
made to the Association as such. Moreover, in the circumstances of this
case, the damage claims are not common to the entire membership, nor
shared by all in equal amount. To the contrary, whatever injury may
have been suffered is peculiar to the individual member concerned, and
both the fact and extent of injury would require individualized proof.
Thus, to obtain relief in damages, each member of Homebuilders who
claims injury as the result of respondent's practices must be a party to
the suit, and Homebuilders has no standing to claim damages on his
behalf. 47
In Cordova v. Bache & Co.48 a federal district court held that "[a]n
association has no standing to assert the rights of its members under the
antitrust laws." 49 Here it was made clear that the standing rule in antitrust
cases is not affected by special rules as to standing which may exist in other
types of litigations where other legal principles or contexts may be involved.
The court took note of the Supreme Court's decision in NAACP v.
43. See Catalfano v. Higgins, 54 Del. 548, 182 A.2d 637, vacated on other grounds, 55 Del.
470, 188 A.2d 357 (1962), in which the concepts are distinguished.
44. Archie v. Shell Oil Co., 110 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. La. 1953), aff'd, 210 F.2d 653 (5th Cir.
1954).
45. 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 17.10, at 401 (2d ed. 1974). See also John L. Walker
Co. v. National Underwriter's Co., 3 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1924).
46. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
47. Id. at 515-16.
48. 321 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
49. Id. at 604.
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Alabama5° where the Court recognized that certain circumstances may
require that an association be permitted to seek vindication of the interests
of its members. The court, however, concluded that such rules do not apply
in private antitrust cases where standing to sue is governed by the express
statutory requirements of section 4 of the Clayton Act."
In an older case the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
dismissed the plaintiff association while permitting plaintiffs suing in their
individual capacities to continue prosecution of the action.52 More recently,
the District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed a
complaint filed against various insurance companies by three trade associa-
tions on behalf of 1,000 independent insurance agents alleging unlawful
terminations and other antitrust violations.53 The court said:
Plaintiffs . . . asked the Court to allow them to bring this suit be-
cause of their identity of interest with their members and because they
are asserting fundamental rights which should outweigh rules of prac-
tice or court administration such as plaintiffs perceive this standing
requirement to be . . . . However, the rights here raised are not cog-
nizable under Section IV of the Clayton Act, which . . . provides a
cognizable claim only to one injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws. The Association's
complaint makes it clear that it is attempting to enforce the rights of its
members, not any rights it has or claims on its own behalf.5 4
No appeal was taken from the order dismissing the association's com-
plaint, and, yet, the same three plaintiff associations plus another associa-
tion brought a subsequent antitrust action which sought relief not only on
behalf of their members, but, unlike their earlier action, also sought relief
for damages to the associations themselves. Again, motions to dismiss were
granted as to the plaintiff associations for failure to satisfy Clayton Act
requirements of injury. The court found that:
Plaintiffs . . . pointed to no direct injury suffered as a result of the
practices engaged in by defendants, nor have they shown that they were
in the target area of the actions by the defendants. Plaintiffs neither do
business with the defendant insurance companies nor compete with
them. Indeed the only loss alleged by plaintiffs is a decrease in member-
ship and dues as a result of the termination of contracts with certain
agents by defendants. This injury is too remote, however, to confer
standing under the Clayton Act. 5
Among the many cases transferred to the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas and consolidated for pretrial proceedings is
the present pending case of In re Beef Antitrust Litigation.56 In this case the
principal plaintiff, an association formed to bring and maintain the suit, has
50. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
51. 321 F. Supp. at 608.
52. Alabama Ind. Serv. Ass'n v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 28 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1939).
53. Nassau County Ass'n of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 345 F. Supp. 645
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
54. Id. at 647-49.
55. Nassau County Ass'n of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 497 F.2d 1151 (2d
Cir. 1974), affirming the dismissal by the lower court.
56. M.D.L. 248 (N.D. Tex., Dallas Div.).
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as its members cattle producers and sellers who claim to have been injured
by alleged antitrust violations. In the complaint it is not alleged that the
association itself engages in the cattle or beef business or that it has in any
way been injured by defendants' alleged conduct. Rather, the association
seeks only to enforce the rights of its members, all of whom have given the
association a power of attorney in fact, and have created an express trust in
the association and its board of trustees to prosecute, as trustee, the action
for their individual and collective benefit.
At a hearing before the District Court for the Northern District of Texas
argument was made in support of a motion to dismiss the plaintiff associa-
tion and its trustees for the reason that its lack of injury precluded standing
to maintain such antitrust action. The court seemed to recognize.that the
association could not prosecute the suit for its members under a mere power
of attorney authorizing a law firm to bring a suit, but it was argued by
plaintiffs' counsel that under applicable state law an express trust had been
created in the association to maintain the suit. The court took this matter
under advisement although indicating that an assignment of the cause of
action to the association would give the association standing, but the matter
of an express trust as conferring standing would require further study. A
subsequent order overruled defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of stand-
ing.57
Although at common law the assignee of a cause of action did not hold
legal title to it and, therefore, could not qualify as a real party in interest,
under present federal rules an assignment passes the title to the assignee
who is then the owner of any claim arising from the cause of action and is
treated as the real party in interest under rule 17(a), even as to antitrust
actions. 8
In Momand v. Universal Film Exchanges59 an antitrust suit was held
properly brought by a single motion picture exhibitor-assignee, as the as-
signee of ten corporations, in an action against eight major motion picture
producers and distributors. In this case the plaintiff, though an assignee,
sued properly in his own right; as the assignee of the total claim of each
assignor corporation, the plaintiff-assignee was the real party in interest
under rule 17(a), and, therefore, was not suing in a representative capacity.
He was not merely a formal party or representative comparable to a trustee
of an estate. 60
An assignee may sue for purposes of collection provided that he holds
legal title to the debt and is the real party in interest. He must, however,
57. By order entered May 24, 1977, the judge ruled that the association and its trustees had
standing to sue under an express trust valid under applicable state law, and as assigneees of the
causes of action of the members of the association.
58. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 41, § 1545, at 651. The author has several times
used valid assignments to transfer causes of action in antitrust litigation. For example, an
assignment may be to convey a cause of action from a corporation serving as a retail outlet to
the individual owner of the outlet's merchandise in a suit against the manufacturer. Also, an
assignment has been used to transfer a cause of action from a small commuter airline corpora-
tion to its former shareholders following the sale of its outstanding shares subsequent to the
institution of an antitrust action. The shares were sold in order to prevent corporate insolvency.
59. 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948).
60. Id. at 44-45. This case also involved complex problems of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, as well as joinder of causes of action.
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account to his assignor for whatever is recovered in the action. 6' In an
antitrust action involving an assignment the court ordinarily should be
satisfied (i) that the plaintiff-assignee is the real party in interest with regard
to the particular claim involved, and does not, for example, hold merely a
general power of attorney, and (ii) that the assignment upon which suit has
been brought is valid.6 -
In Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co. 63 a retail liquor store was
owned successively by the plaintiff individually, in partnership, and a corpo-
ration created by incorporation of the partnership. The corporation was
subsequently dissolved and all the assets were distributed except for the
antitrust cause of action. Subsequent to dissolution the cause of action was
assigned to the plaintiff, and the Fifth Circuit held that the assignment was
valid regardless of formalities of state corporation and partnership law
regarding the transferring of causes of action.
Rule 17(a) provides that a trustee of an express trust may sue in his own
name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought. In
fact, it is the trustee, and not the trust itself, that must bring suit under the
federal rule. In an antitrust action in which one of the plaintiffs named in the
complaint was the trust itself, the complaint was dismissed, with leave to
amend, on the grounds that the trustee was the real party in interest and
should have been named as plaintiff.' 4 The court will ordinarily seek to
ascertain whether the trustee of an express trust has actually had some
property, right, or title to the subject matter of the suit transferred to him.
For a mere agent is not to be confused with a trustee and has no right to
bring suit. The federal court looks to state law to determine the antitrust
trustee's proper status. 65 In a non-antitrust suit, involving a declaratory
judgment as to liability on insurance policies, the law for antitrust cases was
nevertheless correctly set forth as follows: "The essential distinction be-
tween a trust and agency lies in whether the one who stands in a position of
principal or donor parts entirely with the control, possession, and right of
disposition of the party involved."6
Therefore, as is clear from the foregoing discussion, the nexus between
the party bringing the suit and the aggrieved party is closely scrutinized by
courts to ensure the necessary interrelationship of interest.
An additional procedural requirement aimed at obtaining all the necessary
and appropriate parties for a proper disposition of a cause is that of rule 19
which provides that all parties needed for a just adjudication be joined as
parties to the suit.67 This procedural rule has had a long, slow judicial
evolution in response to amendments by the legislature removing the proper-
61. Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282 (1939).
62. See generally id.; Staggers v. Otto Gerdav Co., 359 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1966).
63. 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975).
64. Hershel California Fruit Prods. Co. v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 603 (N.D. Cal.
1954).
65. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64.(1938).
66. U.S. Epperson Underwriting Co. v. Jessup, 22 F.R.D. 336 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd, 260 F.2d
355 (5th Cir. 1958).
67. FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
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indispensable test. A good example of the judicial trend away from depriv-
ing jurisdiction for failure to properly join all parties with an interest is
Robertson v. National Basketball Association.68 Robertson held that rule 19
did not require joining the Players Association as a party plaintiff. Under
rule 19 as amended in 1966 there is no longer the fear that jurisdiction of a
court will be lost by failure to join a claimed indispensable party as party
plaintiff, except in those relatively few cases described in the rule where
either the absence of the party may make it impossible to accord complete
relief among those already parties, or where disposition of the cause in the
absence of such a person may impair or impede his ability to protect his
interest, or leave persons already parties subject to the risk of incurring
double or inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
A type of dispute which generates much judicial response regarding the
procedural requirements of joining parties to the suit is a stockholder's
derivative suit. Brought by a stockholder on behalf of the corporation or
fund, these disputes are governed by rule 23. 1's requirement that the plain-
tiff be a shareholder at the time of the complained of transaction. A deriva-
tive shareholder suit for antitrust damages may be maintained as an equity
action based upon the traditional concept that a stockholder sues on a
corporation's right. 69 In Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc.7" a mutual fund
shareholder was allowed to bring a derivative action on behalf of funds in
which he was actually a shareholder, but he was not permitted to bring a
derivative class action on behalf of other funds similarly situated. The
provision of rule 23,71 requiring the plaintiff to have been a shareholder at
the time of the transaction involved in the complaint, has been held applica-
ble to any derivative stockholder suit based on a violation of federal anti-
trust laws.
7 2
In addition to derivative suits and class actions, dealt with in section VIII
of this Article, suits against heirs of alleged antitrust wrongdoers have also
provided cogent judicial language concerning the procedural requirements
for parties to federal disputes. For example, in Lee v. Venice Work Vessels,
Inc. 71 the Fifth Circuit held that a private cause of action for treble damages
under the antitrust laws does not survive against the heirs of an alleged
wrongdoer when the suit was brought after his estate had been administered
and distributed, and the administrator of the estate had been released. Since
the federal statute creating the antitrust cause of action makes no provision
for abatement or survival, the Fifth Circuit took recourse in the federal
common law, noting that section 2404 of title 2874 provides that a civil action
for damages by the United States shall not abate on the death of a defend-
ant, but shall survive and be enforceable against his estate. Yet no provision
is made for survival or enforcement beyond maintenance of suit against
such estate.
68. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
69. Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953).
70. 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970).
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
72. Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 28 F.R.D. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
73. 512 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1975).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2404 (1970).
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A final area which has led to much judicial reasoning on the procedural
concepts of standing and capacity is the effect of bankruptcy on potential
antitrust claims. In an early suit, the Third Circuit denied standing to a
stockholder-creditor of a corporation forced into bankruptcy by the defend-
ant's antitrust violations. 75 The decision was based upon the lack of any
direct injury to the plaintiff and the fact that redress for the defendant's
action could be obtained more economically by one suit brought by the
corporation rather than actions by "hundreds of thousands of stockhold-
ers." 76 Additionally, it has been held that an antitrust claim alleged to have
arisen prior to the plaintiff's filing for bankrupcy belonged to the trustee in
bankruptcy and not to the bankrupt.
77
Having examined the scope and multitude of judicial response to the
various concepts of standing, capacity, and real party in interest, this Article
analyzes and discusses the requirement of federal jurisdiction in antitrust
disputes.
III. JURISDICTION
Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction ordinarily encom-
passes diversity jurisdiction, 78 general federal question jurisdiction, 79 juris-
diction over laws regulating interstate commerce, 80 or specific federal ques-
tion jurisdiction such as antitrust litigation 8' or securities. 82 In view of the
specific constitutional grant of subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts
under section 15 of title 15 it is not necessary to seek subject matter
jurisdiction elsewhere. It should simply be noted that United States district
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, deriving all their power to hear a
case from congressional grant. Without such a grant they would lack subject
matter jurisdiction.
A complaint principally alleging antitrust violations, however, may also
include causes of action of a non-antitrust nature such as general federal
questions or even common law claims for breach of contract or fraud.
Courts will then be required to inquire into the other federal statutes pertain-
ing to subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether jurisdiction extends
to such additional claims. Indeed, the court may even decide to try the facts
and law pertaining to these claims in the absence of expressly granted
subject matter jurisdiction, and, rather, apply the complementary doctrines
of ancillary or pendent jurisdiction. Therefore, in this Article on federal
procedure as affecting antitrust litigation, it would be insufficient merely to
cite the specific federal question grant and then proceed to the next topic.
Instead, brief mention is made of each of the types of jurisdiction that may
arise in the handling of an antitrust case with attendant non-antitrust claims.
75. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
76. Id. at 709. See also Schaffer v. Universal Rundle Corp., 397 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1968).
77. Burkett v. Shell Oil Co., 448 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1971).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
79. Id. § 1331.
80. Id. § 1337.
81. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15-156 (1970).
82. Id. § 77v.
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The specific grant of jurisdiction over antitrust claims 83 provides that suit
may be brought in any district court of the United States for an injury to
business or property resulting from antitrust violations. 84 Thus, there is no
question as to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in any federal
district court in the country over an antitrust claim, as such jurisdiction is
nationwide. A question still remains, however, as to the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction over the non-antitrust claims which may be included in a
complaint. There still must be personal jurisdiction over the defendant's
person, property, or the res that is the subject of the suit, and in the absence
of such jurisdiction a valid judgment cannot be entered. Additionally, there
must be proper venue, for even though a particular federal district court may
have subject matter jurisdiction, and perhaps even personal jurisdiction
over a defendant, the action must still have been brought pursuant to venue
requirements so that the case will be tried in the district court where the
action may properly have been brought. It must be a court in a federal
district constituting a convenient forum for the particular action and protect-
ing the defendant against selection by the plaintiff of an arbitrary, remote
site for trial. Thus, United States district courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over wrongs committed under the federal antitrust laws. 85
Section 1337 of title 28 establishes subject matter jurisdiction for cases
arising under laws regulating interstate commerce. As pointed out in the
introductory material of this Article, section 1337 does not require an
amount in controversy. 86 To found jurisdiction on section 1337, it is not
necessary that the commerce clause be the exclusive source of federal
power, but only that it be significant. 87 Additionally, courts have held that
federal jurisdiction in an antitrust case requires that the interstate commerce
involved be more than obliquely or incidentally affected. 88
Section 1331 of title 28, discussed in the introduction of this Article,
provides subject matter jurisdiction for cases "arising under" a general
federal question.89 A final statutory provision, section 1332 of title 28,
provides for diversity jurisdiction whereby the federal district courts are
given original jurisdiction over all civil actions where the matter in con-
troversy exceeds the sum of $10,000 and is between citizens of different
states. 0 As indicated, a complaint containing antitrust charges may also
contain allegations of a cause of action between the parties arising out of
purely common law principles under circumstances in which the court,
already having jurisdiction as to the antitrust claims, may hear additional
claims of the complaint founded on diversity jurisdiction.9 1
83. Id. § 15.
84. Id.
85. Banana Distributors, Inc. v. United Food Co., 269 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1959). See also
Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Albert
Levine Associates v. Bertoni & Cotti, 314 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970); see note 2 supra and accompanying text.
87. Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1967); Esposito v.
Schultz, 366 F. Supp. 1059 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
88. Marr-Farr Corp. v. Copley Press, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 456 (N.D. I11. 1974).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970); see note 3 supra and accompanying text.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
91. The Fifth Circuit has recently held that a failure to deny incorporation in the same state
as the citizenship of the plaintiff defeated diversity. McGovern v. American Airlines, Inc., 511
F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1975).
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Personal Jurisdiction. The concept of personal jurisdiction was first es-
poused and developed in the Supreme Court's opinion in Pennoyer v. Neff.9'
In this leading case the Supreme Court stated:
[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over
persons and property within its territory. As a consequence every State
has the power to determine for itself the civil status and capacities of its
inhabitants; to prescribe the subjects upon which they may contract,
the forms and solemnities with which their contracts shall be executed,
the rights and obligations arising from them, and the mode in which
their validity shall be determined and their obligations enforced. . . .93
The court therefore held that "[n]o state can exercise direct jurisdiction and
authority over persons or property without its territory." 94 It reasoned that
the several states were of equal dignity and authority, and independent of
one another, thus limiting the degree of power one state may exercise
outside its boundaries. It was stated to be an elementary principle "[t]hat the
laws of one state have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as
is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by it can extend its
process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to
its decisions." 95 The principle was, therefore, established that, in the ab-
sence of a waiver of the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, the
presence of the defendant within the forum state was a necessary prerequi-
site to a court's exercising personal jurisdiction over him. The Supreme
Court further adopted the view that the exercise of personal jurisdiction was
subject to constitutional limitations, even though the due process require-
ment of the fourteenth amendment had not become effective as of the time
of Pennoyer and was, therefore, inapplicable. The rule of Pennoyer v. Neff
worked well for scores of years, but as transportation improved and society
became more mobile, along with increased industrialization where the prod-
ucts of a manufacturer are sent nationwide, additional grounds for asserting
jurisdiction over individuals beyond the territorial limits of the state became
necessary.
In the landmark modern case of International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash-
ington96 it was held that due process under the fourteenth amendment
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam
when he neither waives process nor is present within the state he must have
certain "minimum contacts" with the forum such that maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. In
the wake of International Shoe there followed McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co.9 and Hanson v. Denckla .98 In McGee it was made clear that
personal jurisdiction could be upheld on very minimal contacts, and the case
is thought to represent the limits of the new concept of personal jurisdiction.
A Texas insurance company was held amenable to service of process by a
92. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
93. Id. at 722.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
97. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
98. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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California court, although the company never maintained an office or agent
in California and the evidence did not show that it ever solicited any
insurance business in California other than the one policy over which suit
had been brought. The company did mail a certificate of insurance to the
insured in California, and the insured mailed his premium payments to the
insurance company in Texas. In Hanson v. Denckla the Supreme Court
showed that there were at least some limits beyond which due process could
not extend. The Court did not give weight to the fact that the settlor, the
appointees, and the beneficiaries of a trust were all domiciled in Florida.
The case was properly analyzed from the standpoint of what the Delaware
trustee had himself done that would constitute minimal contacts by him with
the foreign state.
State Long-Arm Statutes. The various long-arm statutes provide for juris-
diction over nonresident parties in federal disputes. A representative exam-
ple is Texas' long-arm statute, article 2031b,9 section 4 of which provides
that any foreign corporation or nonresident person shall be deemed doing
business in Texas by entering into a contract by mail or otherwise with a
resident of Texas to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this
state, or the committing of any tort in whole or in part in this state. 1° Under
provisions of section 3 of the Act any foreign corporation or nonresident
natural person so doing business in Texas, and not maintaining a place of
regular business in this state or a designated agent upon whom service may
be made, is deemed to have appointed the secretary of state of Texas as
agent for service of process. Following receipt of service the secretary must
forward a copy of such service to the defendant by certified mail.'' In
O'Brien v. Lanpar Co. 102 the Supreme Court of Texas held that if juris-
diction over a nonresident corporation is to be entertained, three basic
factors must coincide: (i) the nonresident defendant or foreign corporation
must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in the
forum state; (ii) the cause of action must arise from, or be connected with,
such act or transaction; and (iii) the assumption of jurisdiction by the forum
state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice. 0 3 This leading case unfortunately was not concerned with the long-arm
statute of Texas, but instead with the long-arm statute of Illinois. The case
involved a suit in Texas upon a judgment secured in Illinois, with the
supreme court reversing the decisions of lower courts and holding that the
Illinois judgment was entitled to full faith and credit in Texas. The O'Brien
case was followed by the Texas Supreme Court in U-Anchor Advertising,
Inc. v. Burt."0 Burt held that while the contract in question obligated the
99. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964).
100. Id. § 4.
101. Id. § 3. The Texas long-arm statute, art. 2031b, is but one such long-arm statute enacted
by the Texas Legislature, following the Supreme Court's decision in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S.
352 (1927), wherein the validity of a nonresident motorist statute was upheld. Texas also has
such a nonresident motorist statute embodied in TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2039b (Vernon
Supp. 1976-77).
102. 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966).
103. Id. at 342.
104. 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 435 (July 13, 1977).
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defendant to perform his payment obligations at the plaintiff's office in
Texas the defendant was therefore held to have been doing business in
Texas under article 2031b; nevertheless, the due process element was held
not to have been met, and, thus, jurisdiction was found not to exist. The
contract was executed in Oklahoma and it called for the plaintiff to place
five advertising displays for the defendant in various locations in Oklahoma.
The Texas Supreme Court determined that the exercise of jurisdiction in
such a case would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. The court expressly disapproved of the holding in Estes Packing Co.
v. Kadish & Milman Beef Co."0 5 Estes had held that due process would not
be violated by the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant even though
his only contact with Texas was the remittance of one check to the Texas
seller.
In Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Lumar'06 a Texas court of civil appeals properly
stated that a determination of whether a Texas court has in personam
jurisdiction over a nonresident requires a twofold inquiry. First, the court
must determine whether the nonresident defendant is amenable to process
under the Texas long-arm statute. 0 7 The second inquiry is whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant is consistent with the
requirements of due process according to the "minimum contacts" test of
International Shoe.18 In Cohn-Daniel Corp. v. Corporation de la Fonda",
the two-prong inquiry for determining in personam jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant was again stated: inquiry must first be made as to
whether the defendant is amenable to process under the Texas long-arm
statute; and secondly, a determination must be made as to whether exercise
of such jurisdiction over the nonresident is consistent with the requirements
of due process of law.1 10 More than the two-prong inquiry may be required
now that rule 108111 has been amended effective January 1, 1976. If valid,
this rule may in itself create long-arm jurisdiction in Texas, independent of
substantive long-arm statutes.'l 2
105. 530 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ).
106. 513 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
107. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964).
108. In support of its approach the lower Texas appellate court cited two Fifth Circuit
opinions pertaining to jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, setting forth the rules for
determination of jurisdiction as stated above. Jetco Electronics Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473
F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973); Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847 (5th
Cir. 1966).
109. 514 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, no writ).
110. Id. at 342. This case held that personal jurisdiction existed over a nonresident defend-
ant for rehabilitation of an old hotel in Santa Fe, New Mexico. The defendant, however, did
receive some of its payments for services by mail in Texas, and preliminary negotiations for the
contract began in Texas between the parties. The court cited Product Promotions, Inc. v.
Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974), an excellent opinion reviewing the law pertaining to
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.
Ill. TEX. R. Civ. P. 108.
112. As recently amended, rule 108, providing for service outside Texas, states that a
defendant served with notice under the rule shall appear and answer as if he had been
personally served within Texas "to the full extent that he may be required to appear and answer
under the Constitution of the United States in an action either in rem or in personam." The
purpose of the amendment is to expand the acquisition of in personam jurisdiction. But
jurisdiction may be a substantive matter beyond the authority of the Supreme Court to
formulate rules of procedure.
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If the corporation, though incorporated in a foreign state, has a principal
place of business in Texas, or has a permit to do business in Texas, then in
personam jurisdiction will lie as a matter of course. Such jurisdiction will
still attach when the activities constitute doing business under the Texas
long-arm statute and when they constitute minimum contacts with Texas
such that the assertion of jurisdiction by a Texas federal court will not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The so-called
two-fold inquiry is for practical purposes equated into the one inquiry as to
the extent of minimum contacts since "doing business" and "minimum
contacts" are inquiries resolved by consideration of the same activities of
the foreign corporation, such as the solicitation of business in the state
through local offices, or the use of locally based agents to further the
company's sales. Thus, whether a federal court may assert jurisdiction over
a nonresident antitrust defendant corporation is resolved by considering
state long-arm statutes and any limitations imposed by due process under
the minimum contacts test.
The same considerations apply to nonresident individuals as to foreign
corporations where the nonresident individuals are engaged in activities
within the forum state in their personal right for their own benefit, as, for
example, when they may be entering the forum state to negotiate a contract
or to secure employment bonuses. A different result, however, is often
reached where an antitrust plaintiff, or other plaintiff, seeks to acquire
jurisdiction over officers or directors of a defendant corporation. If the
named party individual defendants contend that all of their acts within the
forum district were carried out solely to further corporate purposes, and that
they acted solely as corporate officers or directors, then it would appear that
such individuals will not be subject to personal jurisdiction by the corporate
shield. This does not seem to be a sound or logical application of juris-
dictional principles, particularly when such officers and directors, being
brought in a case as named party individual defendants along with the
corporate defendants they serve, will presumably have their costs, attor-
ney's fees, and travel and investigation expenses paid by their corporation.
Where they have knowledge of and participate in the acts complained of on
the part of the corporate defendant whose affairs they are directing, then it
seems proper to subject them to in personam jurisdiction. Yet the indication
in the cases is to the contrary." 3 It has been held that jurisdiction over an
individual cannot be predicated on jurisdiction over a corporation. More
particularly, the courts have held that an individual's transaction of business
within the state solely as an officer of a corporation does not create personal
jurisdiction over the individual in the foreign state." 4
For jurisdiction over individual officers and employees or directors of a
foreign corporation to attach, the individuals as named party defendants
In U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 20 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 435 (July 13, 1977), the Supreme
Court of Texas, in a footnote, stated that the purpose of the 1975 amendment to rule 108 was to
permit acquisition of in personam jurisdiction to the constitutional limits.
113. See, e.g., Lehigh Valley Indus., Inc. v. Birenbaum, 389 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
114. United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1966); Wagman v. Astle, 380




must have been engaged in activities within the jurisdiction of the court that
would subject them to the coverage of the state's long-arm statute.115 The
cases, however, suggest that if it can be shown that a corporation is not
viable and that the individuals are in fact conducting personal activities in
the forum state while merely seeking to use the corporate form to protect
them from potential liability, a court may be justified in piercing such a
corporate veil and asserting personal jurisdiction over such individuals.' 6
The co-conspirator theory has been much discussed in cases and texts,
but for purposes of this Article suffice it to say that where personal juris-
diction is obtained over one alleged conspirator, his mere presence has been
held insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a second alleged co-
conspirator." 7 On the other hand, if the conspirators are deemed agents of
one another and at least one has had sufficient contacts with the forum state
to warrant asserting jurisdiction over him, then personal jurisdiction may
under some circumstances be obtained under state long-arm statutes over
those persons who actually had no physical contact with the state."18
Pendent Jurisdiction. The leading case of United Mine Workers of America
v. Gibbs"9 held that under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction a federal
court having federal subject matter jurisdiction, as in an antitrust case, over
one claim is allowed to assume jurisdiction over a second claim between the
same plaintiff and defendant not founded on federal subject matter juris-
diction provided the second claim derives from a common nucleus of opera-
tive facts such that the plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try both
claims in one proceeding. 2 ° Where a valid claim has been alleged under the
federal antitrust laws, a federal court is permitted in its discretion to assume
jurisdiction over "pendent" claims based on claims of fraud, tortious inter-
ference with business relations, state claims of unfair competition, trade
defamation, or other state claims.''
115. Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 409 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1969); Miller v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 394 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392(E.D. Va. 1975). This latter case held that to allow substituted services through the secretary of
state of Virginia on California residents on the ground that they derived salaries from an
employer that did large amounts of business in Virginia would offend traditional notions of fair
play in violation of due process. See also Path Instruments Int'l Corp. v. Asahi Optical Co., 312
F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), and County Maid, Inc. v. Haseotes, 299 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Pa.
1969), holding that under the Sherman Act individual defendants, who were officers and
management employees of numerous corporations all engaged in one operation, were "trans-
acting business" in Pennsylvania where a corporation had its principal office even though the
individuals were nonresidents. This, of course, is not the usual situation here being discussed,
where both the defendant corporation and the individual defendants are residents of foreign
states.
116. Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Holfield v.
Power Chem. Co., 382 F. Supp. 388 (D. Md. 1974); Alosio v. Iranian Shipping Lines, 307 F.
Supp. 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
117. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Co. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
118. Ghazoul v. International Management Servs., Inc., 398 F. Supp. 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
119. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
120. Id. at 725.
121. Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Co-op. Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1968). See also
Fashion 22, Inc. v. Steinberg, 339 F. Supp. 836 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). There is presently pending a
case in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, in
which former automobile dealers have sued a foreign manufacturer of automobiles alleging
antitrust violations, and in addition have urged causes based on state claims of breach of
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Ancillary Jurisdiction. The concept of ancillary jurisdiction constitutes an
exception to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction and exists to permit a
federal court to try a claim over which jurisdiction would not ordinarily lie
when such claim is closely related to a cause that is within subject matter
jurisdiction. Ordinarily, ancillary jurisdiction attaches to compulsory coun-
terclaims, cross-claims, impleader claims, and intervention claims of right; it
often is not, however, applied to permissive counterclaims, plaintiff's
claims against an impleaded party, or permissive intervention claims.'22 In
an antitrust action for treble damages in which a counterclaim was filed for
defamatory statements, it has been held that there are two causes of action,
one being the federal action on the principal claim and the other the non-
federal action on the counterclaim. Thus, the question in regard to the
counterclaim was one of ancillary jurisdiction rather than pendent juris-
diction, and only the federal cause of action on the principal claim was
maintainable in the federal court. 123
The distinction between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction is difficult to
define, particularly as the usage of the terms by the courts has not always
been consistent and clear. To avoid a multiplicity of suits, a federal court is
permitted under some circumstances to assume subject matter jurisdiction
over a claim where such jurisdiction would ordinarily not be found, pro-
vided the claim is closely related to another claim over which subject matter
jurisdiction undeniably attaches. Pendent jurisdiction was established in
Hum v. Oursler'24 where there were two grounds for a single cause of
action, one federal and the other non-federal. It was held that federal
jurisdiction would attach. Ancillary jurisdiction, by contrast, was found in
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange,'25 where there were two causes of
action: the principal claim and the counterclaim, one of which was federal
and the other non-federal. It was held that the federal court would not
decide the non-federal counterclaim. Pendent jurisdiction, therefore, usual-
ly involves the question of whether, in litigation where there are two
grounds for a single cause of action, the non-federal claim is so logically
connected to the federal claim, and ordinarily provable out of substantially
the same set of operative facts, that a federal court should take jurisdiction
and adjudicate the entire cause. If ancillary jurisdiction is involved, several
questions are presented: whether the counterclaim, cross-claim, or other
claim arises out of the same transaction so as to give the court jurisdiction;
or, if it does not, whether the counterclaim or other claim presents grounds
contract, fraud, and the selling of defective products. Stevenson v. Mazda Motors of America,
Inc., No. CA-3-75-1304-G (N.D. Tex., filed Oct. 22, 1975). The trial court has discretion to
exercise jurisdiction over these state claims along with the claims alleging antitrust violations
over which it has assured subject matter jurisdiction. Jurisdiction on these non-antitrust claims
may further be grounded on diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy so that
subject matter jurisdiction, although of different types, will control the entire litigation. One
day, some years from now, federal courts will probably not be burdened with diversity
jurisdiction, and then in a case such as Stevenson an important question of pendent jurisdiction
will be encountered.
122. 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3523
(1975).
123. National Bowl-O-Mat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 264 F. Supp. 221 (D.N.J. 1967).
124. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
125. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
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upon which a federal court should properly take jurisdiction. While distinc-
tions are often made between pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, the two
concepts arise from the same purpose and are very similar.
Exempted Industries. Courts have exempted various industries, associa-
tions, and governmental business relationships from antitrust scrutiny.
Among the most prominent and important areas exempted are agricultural
co-operatives, government contracts, small businesses, insurance, conduct
of governmental bodies or officials, and organized labor. But the Supreme
Court, in United States v. Borden Co. ,126 upheld a Sherman Act indictment
charging a dairy co-operative with conspiring with milk processors, dis-
tributors, a union, and local health officials to fix milk prices. The Supreme
Court stated that the Capper-Volstead Act did not grant agricultural co-
operatives an absolute immunity from antitrust laws, but only the right
jointly to process, handle, and market their products through a co-operative.
In the domestic insurance industry there has also been a diminishing scope
of exemption afforded by the courts. For years this industry had operated in
the belief that it was not subject to regulation by Congress, in view of an
early Supreme Court decision. Yet, it was nevertheless held in United States
v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association'27 that the insurance business
was within the regulatory power of Congress under the commerce clause,
and a Sherman Act indictment was, therefore, upheld against a large group
of insurance companies charged with conspiring through a rating organiza-
tion to fix fire insurance premiums and to eliminate competition.
The field of organized labor, particularly in the area of professional
sports, has likewise been subject to an evolutionary judicial interpretation of
the extent of its exemption from antitrust regulation. In the sports area the
standing of players to assert antitrust violations, grounded on dictating the
terms upon which the sport is to be played, and by dividing the market of
professional player talent, has generally been well established. Philadelphia
World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc. 128 held that
conduct by the National Hockey League tending to eliminate competition
between competitors for talent was actionable by the players who had been
or were likely to be injured thereby. Standing has also been found for
hockey players challenging the reserve system,'29 basketball players chal-
lenging the college draft system, 3 ° golfers challenging a group boycott, 3 '
and football players challenging blacklisting following a violation of the
reserve clause.' Also, the reserve clause and other intraleague restraints
have been subject to federal court review.' 33
It is now established that as long as a union acts in its self-interest and
does not combine with non-labor groups, union activities are protected; but
126. 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
127. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
128. 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
129. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass.), re-
manded, 472 F.2d 127 (Ist Cir. 1972).
130. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
131. Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
132. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
133. Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
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labor unions lose their exemptions from antitrust charges once they aid non-
labor groups to create business monopolies and to control the marketing of
goods and services. 34 Generally, therefore, there is no operative labor
exemption protecting associations of teams or employers from being sued
for antitrust violations. The statutory bases for labor's exemption from the
application of the antitrust laws are stated in sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton
Act. A concise answer. is that the exemption extends only to labor or union
activities and not to the activities of employers.
Regulated Industries. Exceptions to the antitrust laws for business con-
duct in industry subject to federal regulation have been narrowly con-
strued. 35 Thus, the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction is sometimes, although
infrequently, recognized by a federal court, thereby ousting itself of juris-
diction in a case where jurisdiction of an administrative agency is exclusive
and pre-empts application of the antitrust laws in a judicial proceeding.' 36 In
Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. "p' it was held that exclusive
jurisdiction was in the Civil Aeronautics Board and, therefore, that limited
antitrust immunity existed in a case where the CAB had given prior approval
to the acquisition by Hughes Tool of a controlling interest in TWA. Ordinar-
ily the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction is not appropriate (i) where money
damages are sought, and (ii) unless an administrative agency has issued a
prior order out of which the controversy has directly arisen.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires, when applicable, that prior
resort be had to a governmental agency before a federal court determines
whether an implied repeal of antitrust laws or immunity therefrom would be
necessary to make the regulatory scheme of federal legislation work.'38
Again, this doctrine is not ordinarily successful in requiring a federal court
to give up its jurisdiction since the federal courts, and not governmental
agencies, are deemed to have by far the greater expertise in the handling of
antitrust charges and violations. Furthermore, the federal courts alone can
award money damages in those factual situations where the plaintiff is
entitled to monetary relief. Rate-making schedules, in some aspects, but not
price-fixing conspiracies or refusals to deal, might in the proper case call for
an initial appraisal by an agency. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has
been dealt with by the Supreme Court in Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile
Exchange'39 where the Court held that a broker's private antitrust action for
damages against the Exchange could be stayed until the broker first sought
relief from the Commodity Exchange Commission or the Secretary of Ag-
riculture. The Second Circuit, however, recently rendered a decision result-
ing in a denial of a motion to dismiss on the grounds of primary jurisdiction
in the CAB.' 40 Even though only injunctive relief and not money damages
134. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
135. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 412 (1975).
136. Id.
137. 409 U.S. 363 (1973).
138. See Nader v. Air Transp. Ass'n of America, 426 F. Supp. 1035 (D.D.C. 1977).
139. 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
140. United States Tour Operation Ass'n v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., Nos. 77-7134, -7141
(2d Cir. May 27, 1977).
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were sought in the complaint it was held that the doctrine did not require the
CAB to consider plaintiffs' claims before a court did.
In particular industries such as banking, securities, communications, and
the legal profession the courts have fashioned a theory which clearly evi-
dences the belief that antitrust coverage is necessary. For example, United
States v. Philadelphia National Bank 4 ' dealt with a merger in the banking
industry. The Supreme Court stated that the fact that banking was a highly
regulated industry made the plea of competition not less important but more
so. In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange'42 the Supreme Court held that the
New York Stock Exchange's statutory duty under securities laws to regu-
late the conduct of exchange members, including their relations with non-
members, did not automatically immunize the Exchange and its members
from liability under the antitrust laws.'4 3 In Silver the Exchange had ordered
members to terminate wire services to a non-member securities dealer
without giving the dealer notice or the right to a hearing.'"
In the communications, energy, and transportation fields the Supreme
Court has definitively determined that antitrust coverage is to be extended
despite the presence of federal regulatory bodies operating in these areas.
For example, in Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems,
Inc. 145 the Court held the communications industry subject to antitrust
charges in court proceedings. Also, in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States146 the Court concluded that regulation by the Federal Power Commis-
sion does not exempt an electrical utility from separate enforcement under
the antitrust laws. Finally, in Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United
States 47 the Supreme Court found that the Civil Aeronautics Board regula-
tion of air carriers was designed to deal with a few antitrust problems but
stated that "[t]hose expressly entrusted to it encompass only a fraction of
the total," and therefore, "[tihe Board has no power to award damages or
bring criminal prosecution."'1 48
In the legal profession the recent case of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona 49
promises to have far-reaching antitrust implications. The Supreme Court of
Arizona had censured two lawyers, Bates and O'Steen, for placing an
141. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
142. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
143. Id.
144. Similarly, The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, in
Shumate & Co. v. National Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., C.A. No. 3-4361-C/D (N.D. Tex.),
aff'd, 509 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975), on preliminary motions not
challenged or involved in the subsequent appeal of the cause held that the Maloney Act, 15
U.S.C. § 780-3 (1970), did not give express or blanket exemption to the NASD from antitrust
suits; that an exemption would apply, if at all, only where there was a clear conflict with federal
antitrust laws, which was not found; that immunity if granted, must be limited to only the
minimum extent necessary to make the Maloney Act work; and that even if the NASD were an
exempt group from antitrust laws, nevertheless whenever an exempt group agrees, combines,
or conspires with non-exempt persons in restraint of trade, the asserted exemption is thereby
stripped away. Court orders entered at the trial level did not express the reasons for such orders
as fully as just stated herein, but the import of the orders in light of the contending motions and
briefs and arguments of the parties was as indicated.
145. 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
146. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
147. 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
148. Id. at 311.
149. 45 U.S.L.W. 4895 (U.S. June 28, 1977).
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advertisement in a publication in which they stated that they performed legal
services at very reasonable fees, and listed the charges for five specific
services. The lawyers were found guilty of violating Disciplinary Rule 2-
101(B) of the Code of Professional Responsibility as adopted by the Su-
preme Court of Arizona as its rule 29(a). The United States Supreme Court
held on June 27, 1977, in a five-to-four decision that a total ban upon
advertising by private attorneys enforced by an integrated state bar and state
supreme court violates the first amendment. But all nine Justices agreed that
such a ban, originated by the American Bar Association and incorporated
into a rule of the Arizona Supreme Court, did not violate the Sherman Act,
in view of the state action exemption doctrine of Parker v. Brown. 150
Foreign Parent, Domestic Subsidiary. Typical of this type of dispute was
an antitrust action brought by motorcycle distributors against the Japanese
parent manufacturer, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Inc., and its American
subsidiary, Kawasaki Motors, U.S.A. 151 In that case it was held that the
Japanese parent company ignored the formal corporate division between it
and its American subsidiary and involved itself directly in the subsidiary's
operations and policy decisions and accordingly submitted itself by such
action to the jurisdiction of the federal district court in which suit had been
brought. Moreover, since the parent exerted an inordinate amount of control
over its subsidiary, it was held also to have transacted business in Oregon
through its subsidiary. Similarly, when American subsidiaries doing busi-
ness in New York were agents of their Japanese parents under New York
law, jurisdictional requirements of the antitrust laws were satisfied for
purpose of a suit against the Japanese parents in federal district court in
New York.152 Jurisdiction over a foreign corporation has been upheld based
on the existence of an exclusive distributor in this country with sales of
about $1.3 million annually."'
International Shoe and Hanson v. Denckla concerned defendants acting
in our federal system where the constitutional test is whether the nonresi-
dent defendant had the required contacts with the forum state. In an anti-
trust action against an alien, however, a federally created right is asserted
and the required contacts of the alien for jurisdictional purposes must be
with the United States and not necessarily with any particular district or
150. The argument for the attorneys was made that the Sherman Act's prohibition of
restraint of trade extends to the legal profession under Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773 (1975), and an agreement not to advertise prices is a per se violation of the antitrust Act.
United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, 285 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1961). Disciplinary Rule 2-
101(B) constitutes such an agreement. The Supreme Court recently narrowed the limits of the
Parker "exemption" in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976). Argument for the
State Bar of Arizona on the antitrust aspect of the case was to the effect that the court was
dealing with an express state enforcement of an express state rule, not with private conduct.
Therefore, the Bar argued, the case was put squarely within the rule of Parker and rendered
Cantor inapplicable because the Cantor case dealt with actions of private individuals. Further,
the argument was made that even if the advertising restriction were not exempt, it would still be
a reasonable restraint.
151. Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., United States, 362 F. Supp. 54 (D. Ore. 1973).
152. Sunrise Toyota Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 55 F.R.D. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
153. Scriptomatic, Inc. v. Agfa-Gevaert, Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cas. 74,594 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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forum.1 4 On the other hand, if service of process on the alien is made
pursuant to a state long-arm statute, the constitutional requirement of
minimum contacts with the forum is incorporated by reference.
The American Long-Arm. Similar to the use of state long-arm statutes to
extend jurisdiction to out-of-state parties, the United States can often en-
.force its antitrust requirements against foreign corporations. Ordinarily, the
principle of comity, whereby parties make an objective agreement as to
which country has the paramount interest and then defer to it, is supposed to
control any dispute as to the priority of jurisdiction in a particular case. But
comity is not effective where parties and governments do not exercise
judicial restraint. The federal antitrust statutes represent the American view
that the best economy results from competitive markets. No other govern-
ment tries so hard through its court system to prevent restrictive trade
practices. Nor do other governments strive to bring overseas business
activities within the orbit of judicial sanctions. Yet in a world where heavy
industrialization transcends national boundaries jurisdictional expansion
must follow, even though, for purposes of enforcement, the territorial reach
of antitrust law of the United States to economic activities abroad must
always be dependent upon the jurisdiction or power that a federal district
here can successfully assert over a foreign individual or corporate defend-
ant. Thus, when the United States has the power it may use it.
In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,'5 in an opinion by Judge
Learned Hand, the basic guidelines to overseas enforcement of American
antitrust laws were first enunciated. The case involved a combination of
French, Swiss, British, and Canadian ingot producers, including affiliates of
Alcoa, an American company. The combination agreed to allocate pro-
duction by quotas, with exports to the United States included in the quotas.
It was ruled that protection of the national interest required that the Sher-
man Act apply to restrictive business practices of non-American firms
abroad where those practices were intended to affect and did affect the
foreign commerce of the United States.
In a recent multi-district case the United States and fifty other plaintiffs
sued a British pharmaceutical firm for alleged antitrust violations in export-
ing antibiotics to the United States.'56 The federal district court ruled that
the defense would be subject to a potentially fatal inference for failing to
press the British Government to rescind or modify a non-disclosure order
pursuant to a 1964 Commercial Documents Act. Although representations
by the British Government resulted in the exemption of a small number of
confidential documents, the defendants and the British Government finally
gave in, and the protective order as to the documents sought by discovery
was rescinded. Thereafter, several thousand requested documents were
produced, even though under British law such instruments could not have
been discovered and would not have been admissible as evidence at trial.
154. Distinctions between jurisdiction over United States corporations and alien corpora-
tions are discussed in Edward J. Moriarity & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp.
381 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
155. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
156. In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 55 F.R.D. 269 (D.D.C. 1972).
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Other countries are exercising greater restraint than our country in nation-
al policy towards jurisdiction and judicial process. England, for example,
adheres to a narrowly territorial view of jurisdiction and does not permit
extra-territorial discovery in antitrust cases, and the civil law countries of
Latin America generally determine matters of jurisdiction on the nationality
of individuals and the location of corporate headquarters, rather than on
business transactions.
IV. VENUE
Definitions. Venue in antitrust cases is founded on two sections of the
Clayton Act and supplementary special venue statutes. Section 4 of the
Clayton Act provides that suit may be brought "in the district in which the
defendant resides or is found or has an agent.' 1 57 Additionally, section 12
states that any suit under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be
brought "not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant but also
in any district where it may be found or transacts business."'' 5 Courts have
held the term "resident" to be synonymous with the term "inhabitant."' 59
Also, a natural person is a resident of the district of that state where he has
his domicile or permanent home,160 while a corporation is an "inhabitant" of
the state of its incorporation.16'
The term "found" as used in the Clayton Act has been held to connote
present and continuous local activities within the district. 162 The term
"agent" for venue purposes is not controlled by concepts of agency devel-
oped for other purposes, and the term as used in the Clayton Act does not
subject a person or corporation to suit in any district where he or it has an
agent, no matter how limited the purpose of the agency. 63 "Transacts
business" as used in the Clayton Act has been thought to mean conducting
business in an ordinary and usual sense." 6 The Supreme Court has defined it
to mean the practical everyday business or commercial concept of doing or
carrying on business of any substantial character. 65
157. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
158. Id. § 22.
159. Arrow Mfg. Co. v. Automobile Body Research Corp., 352 F.2d 400 (1st Cir. 1965).
160. Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444 (1892).
161. C.C.P. Corp. v. Wynn Oil Co., 354 F. Supp. 1275 (N.D. II1. 1973).
162. Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 291
F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
163. Boston Medical Supply Co. v. Lee & Febiger, 195 F.2d 853 (1st Cir. 1952); Goldlawr,
Inc. v. Schubert, 169 F. Supp. 677 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd, 276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960); Riss &
Co. v. Association of W. Rys., 159 F. Supp. 288 (D.D.C. 1958).
164. San Antonio Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 499 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1974).
165. United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795 (1948). See also United States v.
National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573 (1948); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Material Co.,
273 U.S. 359 (1927). In Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Cal. 1973), the
court held that attendance at industry-wide sales meetings and alleged conspiratorial meetings
taking place in the forum district does not constitute transacting of business. This ruling is
important because national trade associations tend to bring their member companies together
by scheduled meetings attended by company officers, and discussions may often reach the area
of subjects affecting competition and potential restraints of trade, such as the fixing of prices or
allocation of markets. It has helped many a plaintiff's antitrust case to be able to allege
combinations or groupings of defendant companies for anti-competitive purposes where the
factual setting was actually organized by a trade association whose existence arose out of an




The supplementary venue statutes which are utilized in antitrust cases are
as follows:
(a) 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) which provides that a civil action not founded
totally on diversity may be brought in the judicial district "where all the
defendants reside, or in which the claim arose .... "166
(b) 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) which provides that a corporation may be sued
in any judicial district in which it "is incorporated or licensed to do business
or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the
residence of the corporation for venue purposes. 167
(c) 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) which provides that "an alien may be sued in any
district." 168
(d) 28 U.S.C. § 1392 which provides that any civil action against defend-
ants "residing in different districts in the same state" may be brought in any
of such districts. 169
The term "in which the claim arose" is sometimes used by plaintiffs to
bring actions in the districts of their residence since they are not favored
with this right under section 1391(b), as are diversity plaintiffs under section
1391(a). For a claim to arise in a district there must be sufficient venue facts
to satisfy the "weight of the contacts" test.1.7 The district must be one
where the contacts weigh heavily in that significant sales took place to cause
substantial injury, or some other overt acts, pursuant to conspiratorial
meetings, took place in the forum district constituting a substantial element
of the offense. Conversely, if only a few insignificant sales were made in the
forum district or meaningless meetings of conspirators took place there,
venue would not lie in such district. A claim may arise in more than one
district, but venue is not proper simply wherever any part of the claim,
however small, arose.' 7' The question of where a "claim arose" for pur-
poses of venue is to be decided by state law.' 72
The Fifth Circuit has held that the venue provisions of section 1391(c)
under title 28 are not applicable to corporations suing as plaintiffs. The
effect of the statute is that a corporation may be sued in any judicial district
where it is incorporated, licensed to do business, or is doing business. Under
any of these circumstances the defendant corporation is considered a resi-
dent of the judicial district for venue purposes.'73 Further, the Fifth Circuit
has held that a partnership or unincorporated business association "resides"
or has a "residence" for Jones Act venue purposes 174 in a district in which it
is doing business, even though the district is not the location of the principal
office of the defendant or the district where its owner-partners live.175
166. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1970).
167. Id. § 1391(c).
168. Id. § 1391(d).
169. Id. § 1392.
170. Philadelphia Housing Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 291 F.
Supp. 252 (E.D. Pa. 1968), tests reformulated, 309 F. Supp. 1053 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
171. Honda Associates, Inc. v. Nozawa Trading, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
172. Geodynamic Oil & Gas, Inc. v. United States Silver & Mining Corp., 358 F. Supp. 1345
(S.D. Tex. 1973).
173. Carter-Beveridge Drilling Co. v. Hughes, 323 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1963).
174. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
175. Penrod Drilling Co. v. Johnson, 414 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1969). The Fifth Circuit relied
on Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556 (1967), in which the
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In a suit against a foreign corporation licensed to do business in a multi-
district state, venue will lie in all districts of the licensing state regardless of
the lack of activities in certain of the districts. 76 Numerous cases have held
that where a corporation is incorporated or licensed to do business in a state,
such licensing embraces all districts within the state, and, hence, all districts
are "residences" of the corporation for venue purposes under section
1391(c). This section provides that a corporation may be sued in any judicial
district in which it is incorporated, licensed to do business, or is doing
business. Such a judicial district is to be regarded as the residence of such
corporation for venue purposes.'77 On the other hand, authorities have held
that a corporation which is incorporated or licensed in a multi-district state is
a "resident" only of the district in which it actually does business. 78 A
Texas federal district court, in Energy Resources Group, Inc. v. Energy
Resources Corp.,'179 stated that it saw nothing practical nor reasonable about
requiring a corporate defendant to defend itself in the Southern District of
Texas where it had never done business, and when all its witnesses and
records were located 480 miles from Houston in the Midland-Odessa Divi-
sion of the Western District of Texas. The venue statutes were devised to
achieve two basic purposes: to lay venue in a place having a logical connec-
tion with the parties to the litigation, and to afford the defendant some
protection against the hardship of having to litigate in some distance place.
Such laudable ends could not be served by laying venue in the Southern
District of Texas in such a case, and, therefore, the motion of the defendant
to dismiss for improper venue was deemed well-founded. 8 0
Transfer to Proper Venue or Dismissal. Section 1406(a) of the Judicial
Code provides that "[tihe district court of a district in which is filed a case
laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the
interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it
could have been brought."'' Under the language regarding transfer, it is
plain that whether venue is proper or improper, the case may be transferred
to a district where it might have been brought. Furthermore, the court's
disposition of a motion to transfer a case for improper venue is not appeal-
able as a final order.18 2
In the important case of Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman 83 the Supreme Court
Supreme Court reaffirmed the proposition that for venue purposes a defendant unincorporated
association should be suable as an entity and that the critical factor was the residence of the
entity, rather than of its individual members; it therefore, for the first time, proceeded to hold
that an unincorporated association should be analogized to a corporation.
176. Energy Resources Group, Inc. v. Energy Resources Corp., 297 F. Supp. 232 (S.D. Tex.
1969).
177. See, e.g., Baksay v. Rensellear Polytech Institute, 281 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
DeGeorge v. Mandata Poultry Co., 196 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
178. See, e.g., Joscar Co. v. Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc., 212 F. Supp. 634 (E.D.N.Y. 1963);
Johnson v. B.G. Coon Constr. Co., 195 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
179. 297 F. Supp. 232 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
180. Id. at 234.
181. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1970).
182. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 433 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1970). Transfer may in the proper case,
however, be reviewable by extraordinary writ. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960) (cause
transferred back to the Fifth Circuit).
183. 369 U.S. 463 (1962).
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resolved a sharp conflict among the lower courts by holding that section
1406(a) of title 28 is broad enough to authorize a transfer "whether the court
in which it was filed had personal jurisdiction over the defendants or not. 184
To the many advocates of the contrary position there simply seemed no
justifiable basis on which the court could presume to issue a valid order,
even only for a transfer, without personal jurisdiction first having been
established over the defendant parties affected by such order. It is recog-
nized, however, in some complex cases that the interests of justice are best
served by such handling. One reason sometimes justifying a transfer rather
than a dismissal of a cause not brought in the proper district is found where
the statute of limitations has run so that dismissal would otherwise bar a new
suit by the plaintiff.
In a pending multi-district case 18 5 in which many cases have been trans-
ferred to the Northern District of Texas for pre-trial purposes, numerous
orders have been entered by the presiding district judge as to the problems
here under discussion. Where the district court judge found venue to be
improper, and he so found many times, he elected in all instances to transfer
or provide for transfer by agreement of counsel to a new district upon the
completion of pre-trial, rather than to dismiss any of such actions. The
possibility of the bar of the statute of limitations was present in some of the
situations involving improper venue before the court, and unnecessary filing
and refiling of causes, with further service of process, seemed to the court
not to be required or to serve a useful purpose under the circumstances
before him.
V. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for service of
process in suits in federal courts.' 86 It does not affect jurisdiction or venue
since the federal rules were not intended to deal with these matters. Instead,
the function of rule 4 is to provide the procedural means for bringing notice
of the filing of a suit to the attention of the defendant and to provide for the
assertion of jurisdiction over the action. But underlying the question of the
manner of service of process is the validity of issuance, by a particular
court, of a summons on a defendant for a court appearance regarding the
claim being directed against him. Lack of proper service, however, is not
jurisdictional, and is no longer a factor in a case where there is a waiver or
voluntary appearance by the defendant.
Nationwide Service of Process Under Section 12 of the Clayton Act. It is
often said that in an antitrust suit service of process is "nationwide." What
is meant, of course, is that where venue is properly laid under section 12,187
service of process may then be made at the principal place of business of a
corporation or at the office of the registered agent of a defendant in its state
of incorporation. 188 Naturally, this service of process depends on the suit
184. Id. at 466.
185. In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. 248 (N.D. Tex., Dallas Div.).
186. FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
187. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1970).
188. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
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being filed in a district specified by section 12; that is, a district where the
defendant is an inhabitant, where it may be found, or where it transacts
business. Service may also ordinarily be had pursuant to state long-arm
statutes, as such service is an alternative provided by federal rule 4. Since
venue may be properly laid not only under section 12 of the Clayton Act but
also under section 1391(c) of the general venue statutes,189 the process which
then must be served will ordinarily reach the defendant and be effective
wherever the defendant may be found.
It has been stated that in order to obtain personal jurisdiction over a party
in an antitrust proceeding the party must be amenable to service of process
and must be properly served, not simply by delivering a copy of the sum-
mons to a clerk or janitor but only upon a person suitable for acceptance of
process.190 Three basic ways are recognized in which personal jurisdiction
over an antitrust defendant can be secured. First, the plaintiff can lay its
venue in one of the judicial districts described by section 12 of the Clayton
Act and then by virtue of the provisions of that section can serve the
defendant at his home office or wherever it may be found. Second, the
plaintiff may sue in a district where the defendant has an agent authorized to
accept service of process and serve its summons on that agent. Third, the
plaintiff may obtain service through the applicable long-arm statute of the
forum state.191
Service of Process upon Alien Corporations. Rule 4 also provides for
service in a foreign country. It has been held that service on an alien
corporation found outside the United States can properly be made, assum-
ing venue is properly established.'92 Further, it has been held that a defend-
ant corporation was properly served under the New York long-arm statute
by registered letter service at the Italian headquarters of defendant and by
personal service on the general manager of defendant in Italy by a court-
designated Italian attorney.' 93 The court concluded that personal service in
Italy was valid under section 12 of the Clayton Act as well as under rule 4 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' 94 As has been demonstrated by the
preceding discussion of the venue requirement, provisions of the Clayton
Act and the supplementary general venue statute have widespread applica-
tion and importance in antitrust disputes. This Article now focuses on the
matters and issues involved with the federal pleading requirements in an
antitrust context.
VI. PLEADINGS
Unlike state court pleading in Texas, where no rule of procedure requires
that the court's jurisdiction be specifically pled, federal rule 8(a)(1) provides
189. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1970).
190. FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
191. See discussion in 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 41, §§ 1061-75 (1969); ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 132, at 360-61.
192. Intermountain Ford Tractor Sales Co. v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 210 F. Supp. 930(D.
Utah 1962).
193. Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
194. Id. at 79-80.
[Vol. 31
ANTITRUST PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE
that a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief shall contain "a short and
plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends,
unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds
of jurisdiction to support it."' 95 Therefore, it is mandatory practice that all
subject matter jurisdiction be affirmatively pled with specific reference to
the federal jurisdictional statute providing power for the court to go forward
with the action. United States district courts are of limited jurisdiction, with
their authority to hear a case wholly dependent upon congressional enact-
ment of one of the Constitution's grants of subject matter jurisdiction.' 96
Under the early view of proper pleading in federal courts the facts con-
stituting the antitrust violations were required to be alleged in substantial
detail.' 97 Under the modern view of pleading in federal litigation, such as in
an antitrust action, only a short and plain statement of the claim for relief is
required under rule 8(a). 198 New Home Appliance Center, Inc. v. Thomp-
son, 199 for example, held that the liberal rules of pleading are as applicable to
antitrust cases as to any other and that it is sufficient if the complaint
contains a general allegation of the facts constituting the claim for relief.
Additional cases hold that there are no special rules of pleading for antitrust
cases and that notice pleading is sufficient, whether the case is complex or
not. 20
It has been held that an allegation of public injury is no longer required.2 °'
The Supreme Court has held that to state a claim under which relief can be
granted under section 1 of the Sherman Act, allegations sufficient to show a
violation and resulting harm to the plaintiff are all that is required. No harm
to the general public need be alleged.20 2 The Fifth Circuit, however, appears
to adhere to the earlier view, 2°3 holding that it is not enough for a plaintiff in
seeking recovery under a restraint of trade claim to show only a violation of
the antitrust laws and damage to himself. Plaintiff, in the view of the Fifth
Circuit, should further plead and prove that the restraint tends or is reason-
ably calculated to prejudice the public interest. The plaintiff is not, how-
ever, required to shoulder the more onerous burden of proving specific
economic injury to competition.
195. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1).
196. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 41, § 1063, at 202-03 (1969).
197. Bales v. Kansas City Star Co., 336 F.2d 439, 443 (8th Cir. 1964); Alexander v. Texas
Co., 149 F. Supp. 37 (W.D. La. 1957); Bairn & Blank, Inc. v. Admiral Corp., 132 F. Supp. 412
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
198. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
199. 250 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1957).
200. Clausen & Sons v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 284 F. Supp. 148 (D. Minn. 1967). See
also Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957). In the In re BeefAntitrust Litigation,
currently pending before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas,
Dallas Division, many of the complaints number only about eight pages, yet the relief sought in
this complex litigation, on a trebled basis, is said to be in the area of six billion dollars. In one
amended pleading, presented by a great number of individuals, 28 pages are used in stating the
names and identities and connections with the litigation of the parties, plaintiff and defendant;
yet, only six pages are used to describe the nature of trade and commerce involved, the
offenses charged, fraudulent concealment as to the existence of the combination or conspiracy
being complained of, injury to the plaintiffs, a consumer retail price fixing claim, and the
restraint of trade claim pertaining to wholesale meat producing operations.
201. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
202. Id. at 659-60.
203. Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690, 699 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 943 (1976).
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Capacity. Rule 9(a) of the federal rules makes it unnecessary to plead the
legal existence, authority, or capacity of a party.2"4 Because of this rule it is
not necessary to plead that the plaintiff or defendant is a corporation,
partnership, administrator, trustee, or other representative. It is good prac-
tice, however, to state allegations of capacity, both in the caption and in the
allegations of the pleading itself.2 °5 In only one instance is the pleader
expressly required by rule 9(a) to allege capacity or a legal existence in the
complaint, and that is when such allegation is necessary to show the juris-
diction of the court. When jurisdiction is founded on the presence of a
federal question, the claimant must allege those facts relevant to capacity
that are needed to show the existence of the federal claim. Rule 9(a) requires
that a party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal existence or capacity of a
party must do so "by specific negative averment." 2"6 Capacity, therefore,
cannot be raised as an issue merely by general denial. In fact, in Marston v.
American Employers Insurance Co. 207 it was held that rule 9(a) requires not
only that a defendant deny each and every averment in a complaint but also
that the denial must include "such supporting particulars as are peculiarly
within the pleader's knowledge."2 '
Separate Paragraphs and Separate Counts. Rule 10(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure appears to require pleading in separate paragraphs
and separate counts. 20 9 However, as to the requirement of rule 10(b) that
pleading be divided into numbered paragraphs, courts have denied motions
to direct plaintiff to subdivide allegations in an antitrust action in two
numbered paragraphs in view of the multiplicity of facts involved in a charge
of violation of antitrust laws. 210 Additionally, despite the second sentence of
rule 10(b) mandating that each claim founded upon a separate transaction or
occurrence be stated in a separate account, it has nevertheless been held
that a series of acts allegedly violative of antitrust laws need not be sepa-
rately stated.2t'
VII. DISCOVERY
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 and
the Texas rules in 1941, cases were tried on the basis of what witnesses said,
and, when settled prior to trial, were settled on the basis of what attorneys
for the parties thought the witnesses would say if trial were had. With
promulgation of federal and state rules attorneys began taking oral deposi-
tions of opposing parties. Often written or oral statements would be taken of
potential witnesses. More recently, discovery processes have become more
and more common, so that today discovery takes up by far the greatest
204. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(a).
205. See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 41, § 1292 (1969).
206. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(a).
207. 439 F.2d 1035 (Ist Cir. 1971).
208. Id. at 1041.
209. FED. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
210. United States v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., I F.R.D. 358 (D. Del. 1940).
211. Michigan Gas & Elec. Co. v. American Elec. Power Co., 41 F.R.D. 462 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
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amount of time of all pre-trial procedures combined. The burden on lawyers
is that their preparation is as hard, or harder, than the actual trial of a case.
The burden on the judges is that they are called upon to determine questions
such as relevancy prior to a trial on the merits so that they do not always
have the benefit of the predicate necessary for proper resolution of the
question. Additionally, more and more time of the courts is being required to
rule on discovery motions and possible sanctions when discovery orders do
not appear to have been fully complied with. It is now commonplace to
observe that procedure prior to trial has advanced from the state of use of
discovery to abuse of the process. Undoubtedly some tightening of the free
discovery reins must be accomplished, at first informally, and perhaps in
one federal jurisdiction at a time, and then finally in some new formal
expressions in amendments to the discovery rules. The pendulum has swung
too far on the side of free use of discovery techniques, and every litigant,
attorney, and judge familiar with the pre-trial scene today knows the imbal-
ance must be soon corrected. The precise manner of revising the rules has
not yet been determined. Some may suggest that each party initially be
limited to a certain number of questions ("Twenty Questions"?) with any
additional interrogatories to be filed only upon approval of the court after
motion and good cause have been shown. Others advocate the abolition of
interrogatories altogether. There could also be a time limitation on the fact-
finding period of pending litigation, with appropriate sanctions for failure of
cooperation. Briefly, in the headings that follow, there will be a tracing of
developments pertaining to discovery up to the present, along with ref-
erences to a few of the important rules and cases.
Scope of Discovery Under the Federal Rules. Rule 26(b) 212 provides that
parties may obtain discovery for any unprivileged, relevant matter. It has
been the source of much litigation as the courts have grappled with the
determination of the proper limits to place on discoverable subject matter.
As stated in the famous "work product of an attorney" case, Hickman v.
Taylor, 1 3 deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal
treatment. "No longer can the time-honored cry of 'fishing expedition'
serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his oppo-
nent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both
parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel
the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.''214
What is "relevant" to the subject matter, under rule 26(b), is difficult to
define. No doubt the requirement of relevancy should be and has been
212. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b), which provides that:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates
to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense
of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condi-
tion, or location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It
is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at
the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.
213. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
214. Id. at 507.
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construed liberally. In fact, "it is not too strong to say that a request for
discovery should be considered relevant if there is any possibility that the
information sought may be relevant to the subject matter of the action."2 15 A
determination of relevancy is not even limited to the issues joined by the
current pleadings then on file.2"6 Finally, as to privilege, generally federal
law as to privileged matter controls, except in cases where state law governs
under the Erie doctrine. 217
Abuses of Burdensome Discovery. In the Beef Industry Antitrust Litiga-
tion previously referred to, there is presently on file a first set of plaintiffs'
joint consolidated interrogatories comprising 176 pages. The 155 numbered
interrogatories are subdivided into about 1,800 separate parts. Because of
extensive cross-referencing among the interrogatories, the total number of
questions posed for the defendants runs into the tens of thousands. Some
interrogatories, for example, each ask thirty-five questions about eleven
different beef products. Thus, these interrogatories actually represent over
12,000 separate questions. Further, the interrogatories cover the time span
of the last fourteen years. In some cases information is sought dating back to
the year 1940 and even back to the early years of the century. In one
interrogatory the defendant is asked to "identify" each and every telephone
call made or received by its employees since 1963 while the particular
defendant, engaged in the business of publication of news concerning the
meat industry, was about its work in gathering such industry news. Another
interrogatory even demands identification of all personnel of the defendant
company since the year 1940, whose spouse or other relatives within the
second degree, as defined by civil law, have held stock in, made loans to, or
have served as an officer, director, or employee of another company in the
beef industry.
This type of discovery has forced the Supreme Court to express growing
concern over discovery techniques that are getting out of hand and, if
unchecked, will undoubtedly ruin and make totally unusable what would
otherwise have been a step forward toward justice in the administrative
process. Thus, in Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores218 the Court first
observed that extensive and liberal discovery which produces relevant evi-
dence useful in determining the merits of the claims is discovery to be
encouraged. On the other hand, the Supreme Court said, "[b]ut, to the
extent that it permits a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim to simply
take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so
representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value rather than a
reasonably founded hope that the process will reveal relevant evidence, it is
a social cost rather than a benefit.- 21 9
A judge of one of the federal district courts for the Northern District of
Texas in a recent case rather eloquently stated his recognition of the abuses
215. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 41, § 2008, at 46-47 (1970).
216. Stevenson v. Melady, I F.R.D. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
217. Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 455 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1972).
218. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
219. Id. at 741.
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of present discovery practices and his determination to use sanctions where
necessary in correcting such unwarranted practices. The court stated:
This case makes abundantly clear that the supposedly self-executing
federal discovery rules are being abused. Apparently my prior policy,
which included a reluctance to use Rule 37 sanctions, has not worked.
Henceforth, I will embark on a different course liberally using the full
range of Rule 37 sanctions in appropriate circumstances. My aim is to
achieve maximum discovery with minimum involvement of this
court.2 20
Protective Orders in Relief of Burdensome Discovery. Rule 26(c) of the
federal rules provides that upon motion and for good cause shown a forum
court may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or ex-
pense.22' Such an order may provide that discovery not be had, or may be
had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the
time or place for discovery. It may also provide that discovery may be had
only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking
discovery. For example, in the Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, regarding
portions of the first set of interrogatories propounded to one of the defend-
ants, it was agreed by the parties, pending court decision on a motion for
protective order, that oral depositions would be taken of certain officers and
employees of the defendant rather than seeking to compel the defendant to
answer the numerous and complex interrogatories to which it objected.
Further, a protective order may be entered that certain matters not be
inquired into, or that discovery be conducted with no one present except
persons designated by the court, or that a deposition after being sealed may
be opened only by order of the court. A protective order may provide that a
trade secret or other confidential development not be disclosed. A court
may further order that parties simultaneously file specified documents or
information to be opened as directed by the court. A protective order that
discovery not be had at all is regarded as an unusual and unfavorable means
of preventing abuse in view of the power of the court to control the details of
time, place, and scope for the protection of the parties.222 Alternatively, it is
not uncommon that a protective order be entered that the party seeking
burdensome discovery pay expenses or costs of research.223
Not all abuses of the discovery rules are, by any means, caused because a
party files so much material that a case is made unnecessarily complex. On
the contrary, equally offensive are the numerous practices of evasion by a
party served with interrogatories. For example, in the Beef Industry Anti-
trust Litigation, plaintiff's first interrogatories asked the defendant to
itemize "fixed expenses," for a period of time in processing and selling
choice or equivalent grade beef, hamburger beef, and all other beef. In the
220. SCM Societa Commerciale S.p.A. v. Industrial & Comm. Research Corp., 72 F.R.D.
110 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (Hon. Robert Porter, United States District Judge).
221. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
222. Investment Properties Int'l, Ltd. v. los, Ltd., 459 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1972).
223. Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., No. CA-3-7838-F (N.D. Tex., filed
Oct. 26, 1977) (discovery expenses charged against attorneys rather than parties).
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following interrogatory, the.plaintiff asked that the defendant itemize "vari-
able expenses" for the period defined in processing and selling the same
type of beef. The defendant responded by objecting to such interrogatory
for failing to define the terms "fixed expenses" and "variable expenses."
Further objections were made on the grounds that such interrogatories were
not relevant to the subject matter of the suit, nor reasonably calculated to
lead to discovery of admissible evidence, and for other grounds. In view of
the approach taken by the plaintiffs to define and set exact boundaries to the
scope of answers desired, there may well have been no other course for the
defendant to follow, unless, of course, the defendant were simply to have
set out all possible data in rather bulk fashion, with the plaintiffs then to sift
through the information. In any event, the court may be called upon to
consider the propriety of entering an order compelling discovery under rule
37(a).224 Ultimately, if definitions and terms are cleared up, the court may
deem an evasive or incomplete answer as a failure to answer, and may grant
a motion for relief including an award of reasonable expenses incurred in the
obtaining of such an order, including attorney's fees. For failure to comply
with an order compelling discovery, the sanctions of rule 37(b) 2 5 may be
very severe. For example, the failure may be considered a contempt of
court, and an order may be entered refusing to allow the disobedient party to
support or oppose designated claims or defenses or prohibiting him from
introducing designated matters in evidence.
The proper limits to which discovery is to be allowed have occupied the
courts' attention in many antitrust disputes. For example, discovery is
permissible as to acts and events transpiring subsequent to those giving rise
to the cause of action where there is a possibility that the information sought
may be relevant to the subject matter of the pending action. 226 But in
Delaware Tool Steel Corp. v. Brunner & Lay, Inc.227 defendant's inter-
rogatories as to relationships between plaintiff and defendant's predecessor
corporations and the status of plaintiff's business in the years before the
alleged violations were held not relevant. Similarly, documents to which a
defendant stock exchange could discover policies of the Antitrust Division
of the United States Department of Justice and the SEC concerning the
defendant's anti-rebate rule were discoverable unless otherwise
privileged.228 Finally, in an action in which an automobile dealer alleged
antitrust violations by an automobile manufacturer in the establishment of
sales incentive programs which effectively precluded plaintiff's participa-
tion, the defendant was compelled to answer interrogatories requiring iden-
tification and description of the five most recent documents relating to the
result of any sales incentive program conducted in any metropolitan area in
the United States.229
224. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
225. Id. 37(b).
226. Goldfinger v. Boron Oil Co., 60 F.R.D. 562 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
227. Delaware Tool Steel Corp. v. Brunner & Lay, Inc., 19 F.R.D. 375 (D. Del. 1956).
228. Thill Secs. Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange, 57 F.R.D. 133 (E.D. Wis. 1972).




By no means should it be thought that the preceding cases evidence an
uninterrupted trend towards expanding the limits of permissible discovery.
Many cases propound the judiciary's belief that there are proper limits to be
placed. For example, in an antitrust suit involving a conspiracy to deprive
plaintiff's theater of second-run films, the court held that inquiries on a
nationwide scale were not relevant and interrogatories would have to be
limited to the specific locality involved.23 ° In another case information was
sought by interrogatories as to total purchases from 1920 to 1948 of tires and
tubes, as original equipment, purchased by an automobile company from a
tire company and the tire company's competitors. The court held the ques-
tions relevant to proof of conspiracy and restraint of trade, but separation of
statistics into classes of tires and tubes, and to divisions or subdivisions of
the automobile company was held to be irrelevant.23
The cases discussed above, and a plethora of others, show the increasing
judicial awareness to the problems inherent in blind adherence to the belief
that everything "relevant" is discoverable. There should be and are proper
limits to what is discoverable where the scope of the case tends to be
massive. Class action suits in antitrust matters compose an area holding
many recent decisions of interest and this Article now focuses its attention
on the problems involved in maintaining such actions.
VIII. ANTITRUST CLASS ACTIONS: SOME RECENT DECISIONS OF INTEREST
Determining Whether Action is Maintainable as a Class Action. Rule 23 of
the federal rules does not specify when a court must determine whether an
action sought to be maintained as a class action may be so certified. The rule
does, however, say that the determination is to be made "as soon as
practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class ac-
tion."232 This language has been given wide and varying interpretation, and
it is not at all uncommon for a complex case to be pending far longer than a
year before entry of a court order denying or granting class action status.
This is probably a matter requiring attention in a future revision of the rule.
Also, the rule itself is not specific as to the manner or scope of limited class
action discovery, so prevalent today, wherein discovery on all issues other
than the class action issue may actually be stayed pending resolution of the
form of class action order. This results in extending greatly the time a case is
held pending prior to trial on the merits. The present practice can doubtless
be improved upon, as it seems an unwarranted doubling of time and expense
for attorneys and witnesses to have their depositions arranged for and taken
twice in the same case simply because counsel for one party or the other
may be able to insist, under the present state of the rule, that the scope of
the depositions should be limited the first time around. Also, a future
revision of the class action rule should undoubtedly have some language
230. William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 201 (E.D.
Pa. 1971).
231. United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 13 F.R.D. 98 (N.D. Il. 1952).
Further, discovery was refused altogether as to questions regarding the financial arrangement
between plaintiff and counsel in Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1228 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
232. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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pertaining to the type of hearing necessary for the class action motion,
whether entirely in the form of factual affidavits or witnesses in open court.
Mini-hearings on the merits, as in a typical trial, seem to be the approved
form for proceeding at this time, but if facts are to be resolved by the in-
court appearance of witnesses, one wonders why a jury would not be
appropriate, and if not, then why the hearing should not be confined to
affidavits and depositions as on motions for summary judgment. For exam-
ple, in Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk A.G.23 3 nine days of testimony were
presented at a class action hearing. Unfortunately, it is not unusual for such
a "mini-hearing" in the federal districts of Texas to last several days.
Statute of Limitations. The problems involved with defeating the bar of
limitations in antitrust class actions is a hurdle that poses serious problems
to plaintiffs in such actions. Recent cases have propounded the general rule
regarding the tolling of the statute during class actions. It has been held that
the statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of the class certifica-
tion motion.234 Most lawyers active in the antitrust field are familiar with the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in American Pipe & Construc-
tion Co. v. Utah235 where it was held that commencement of a class action
suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of
the class who would have been parties had the action been permitted to
continue as a class. The purported class action under section I of the
Sherman Act had been brought eleven days before the end of the limitation
period provided for in the Act. The Court later found the suit inappropriate
for class action because of a failure to demonstrate the required numerosity
of class members; thus, the Court held that those persons previously pro-
spective members of the class had an additional eleven days in which to
move to intervene in the existing suit or file their own causes of action.
Notice and Costs. These requirements and burdens pose particular prob-
lems in class action suits. Case law dealing with these two issues reveals the
extent to which they can become a crucial factor in the litigation of an
antitrust suit. For example, defendant proposed, in In re Arizona Bakery
Products Litigation,236 that the notice to be sent to the class by the plaintiff
representative refer to the possibility of discovery interrogatories against
individual members of the class. The court rejected the request. Similarly, in
Love's Wood Pit Barbeque, Inc. v. Bell Brand Foods, Inc. 237 a defendant's
request was denied. The defendant requested that a notice to prospective
members of the class include the possibility that they would be taxed for
costs if the suit were lost and further that counterclaims might be brought
against them individually. Also, courts have entered orders that require
notice to be given by direct mail to the last known address of class mem-
bers. 238 A fairly unique "piggy-back" style of notice was approved by the
233. 61 F.R.D. 427 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
234. Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co., 511 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1975).
235. 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
236. 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,556 (D. Ariz. 1975).
237. 1974-1 Trade Cas. 74,905 (S.D. Cal. 1973).
238. Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114 (8th Cir. 1975).
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court in In re Arizona Dairy Products Litigation.239 There the court approved
notice to members of the class where such notice was printed on the sides of
milk cartons delivered during a sixty-day period. Plaintiffs were required to
reimburse defendants, however, for costs of this form of notice. Finally, in
Foster v. Maryland State Savings & Loan Ass 'n24° it was held that the cost
of notice to be paid by the plaintiff included postage, stuffing, and mailing,
but not the cost of supplying the names and addresses of the class, which
may otherwise have been the greater part of the cost to the plaintiff.
Certainly in some cases this would be a large portion of the costs, for
example, in brokerage cases where many members of a class have held their
stocks in "street name" and their individual names are not readily available
but may be in files placed in storage.
Dismissal and Compromise. Settlements and compromises obviously re-
sult in dismissals of a great number of antitrust disputes, with the aggrieved
party often getting the financial remuneration necessary to compensate for
the damages suffered. Because of the effect that these settlements have on
other parties in the industry, courts have often dealt with the requirements
for a valid settlement. In Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co. 241 the
court set forth the requirements for a finding of fairness as to a settlement
proposal. Courts have also held that notice of settlement mailed nineteen
days prior to the hearing complied with due process and rule 23 require-
ments. 24 2 Further, it has been determined that such notice was not intended
to be a complete source of settlement information to members of the class
and that there was no requirement that the text of the settlement agreement
had to be included in the mailed notice.243 In Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. 244 the often-cited case on
standards for awards of counsel fees, the court set forth factors it con-
sidered to be of prime importance in the awarding of fees for attorneys
successful in obtaining a class fund for distribution to class members. The
factors were hours spent and rate therefor, the contingent nature of the
employment, and the quality of the attorney's work, which in part would be
reflected by the benefit to the class.245 In addition to the recent development
of the law pertaining to class actions, antitrust disputes have also led to the
development of a very new method of federal procedure, the multi-district
federal litigation.
IX. MULTI-DISTRICT LITIGATION
Background Giving Rise to M.D.L. Cases. In the 1960's federal courts,
following successful criminal antitrust prosecution of a number of electrical
equipment manufacturers, were faced with disposing of more than 1,800
239. 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,555 (D. Ariz. 1975).
240. 1974-2 Trade Cas. 75,277 (D.D.C. 1974).
241. 1973-1 Trade Cas. 74,398 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
242. Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 121 (8th Cir. 1975).
243. Id. at 122.
244. 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
245. Id. at 166-67.
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separate civil damage actions filed in thirty-three different federal district
courts. Cooperation by the judges and attorneys involved in the cases
resulted in these time-saving procedural steps: (1) coordinated pre-trial
discovery proceedings; (2) national depositions with lead counsel for plain-
tiffs and defendants; (3) a document depository containing over one million
documents available to all parties. By 1968 all of the actions had been
terminated, with judicial economy and convenience to the parties and
courts.246 Based on such experiences in the electrical equipment cases the
judicial conference proposed the enactment of a new venue provision that
became our present section 1407 of title 28.247 This new venue statute
became law in 1968. It provides that:
[w]hen civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact
are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any
district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such
transfer shall be made by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation
authorized by this section upon its determination that transfers for such
proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and
will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions.248
Under subsection C of this section the specific provision is made for the
judicial panel of multi-district litigation to transfer an action upon its own
initiative.
Although section 1407 contemplates that "[elach action so transferred
shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial
proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have
been previously terminated, 21 49 in actual practice the transferee court for
pre-trial purposes may often do otherwise. Either on motion of a party or on
the judge's own initiative, at the close of pre-trial, the judge may transfer the
case to himself for all purposes under section 1404(a) for the convenience of
parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice, thus giving the trans-
feree court the right to conduct the trial on the merits. 50 Such a transferee
judge, through the knowledge and expertise acquired by him during the pre-
trial proceedings, may often be in the best position to try the cases correctly
and expeditiously.25" ' In Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord252 the transferee court, following
the denial of a writ of mandamus sought by the non-settling defendants,
ordered all the actions transferred to Minnesota for trial under section
1404(a). In most instances the transferee court would, as indicated, have
become the preferable court for trial on the merits in view of the countless
246. See Neal & Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases; Novel Judicial Ad-
ministration, 50 A.B.A.J. 621 (1964).
247. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1970).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. § 1404(a).
251. See In re Penn Central Securities Fraud Litigation, M.D.L. 56 (E.D. Pa. 1976), where
the author was the court-appointed class action counsel for the Great Southwest Corporation
Shareholders. Had the various cases transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for
consolidated pre-trial proceedings not been settled at the end of pre-trial, it is likely that on
motions of the parties or on the court's own intiative such causes would have been transferred
to such transferee court for trial on the merits.
252. 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971).
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proceedings that it would have ruled on during the course of pre-trial
matters.
X. CERTAIN PRE-TRIAL MOTIONS
Motion to Prohibit Communications with Potential Class Members. By
order entered February 27, 1970, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas adopted local rule 4 to prevent potential abuse of
class actions.- In this order all parties and their counsel in any potential or
certified class action under rule 23 were expressly forbidden to communi-
cate with any potential or actual class member not a formal party to the
action without court approval. Communications forbidden by local rule 4
included, but were not limited to, the following: (a) direct or indirect solicita-
tion of legal representation of potential and actual class members who are
not formal parties to the class action; (b) solicitation of fees, expenses, and
agreements to pay fees and expenses from potential and actual class mem-
bers who are not formal parties to the action; (c) formal parties' solicitation
of class members to opt in or out of the class action; and (d) communications
from counsel or a party which may tend to misrepresent the status, pur-
poses, effects of the action, or court orders.254 This rule did not contain the
important proviso included in the form of order set forth in the manual for
complex litigation. 2" This proviso excepted, inter alia, communications
between an attorney and a prospective client initiated by the prospective
client. From time to time the rule would be modified in cases in the Northern
District of Texas so that in effect attorneys would be bound only by the
portion thereof already amply covered by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.256 In Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp.257 a district court
rule applicable to class actions, similar to local rule 4, which required prior
judicial approval of communications between plaintiffs and their attorneys
and third parties, was held outside the statutory authority of the district
court and possibly unconstitutional under the first amendment to the Feder-
al Constitution, although the constitutional issue was not determined. Local
rule 4 was then rescinded following motions and hearings in the Beef Indus-
try Antitrust Litigation currently pending in the Northern District of Texas.
Motion for Preservation of Documents and Non-Destruct Order. In United
States v. International Business Machines Corp. 258 the court addressed itself
to the question of whether a particular document's preservation order, entry
of which had not been opposed, had been violated by one of the parties. The
253. N.D. TEX. LOCAL R. 4 (Misc. 688).
254. Id.
255. The manual for complex and multi-district litigation was promulgated in 1968 by the
coordinating committee for multiple litigation of the United States District Court. Techniques
and methods suggested by the manual are not mandatory and some federal judges use the
manual extensively while others employ it sparingly. It is designed to apply not only to multi-
district cases but' to any complex case and in the foremost rank of cases designated by the
manual as typically requiring special handling are the antitrust suits.
256. Stevenson v. Mazda Motors of America, Inc., No. CA-3-75-1304-G (N.D. Tex., filed
Oct. 22, 1975).
257. 508 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1975).
258. 66 F.R.D. 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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question was raised as to whether the strict standards governing the issuance
of restraining orders and injunctions must be observed under rule 65 of the
federal rules.259 Naturally, no court wants to sit idly by while relevant
written materials are destroyed or mislaid. Often the relevancy of such
materials cannot be determined before a predicate is laid for their admission
at actual trial. Therefore, courts in complex cases will frequently provide for
document depositories. In the Penn Central Securities Fraud Litigation
260
over a million documents were maintained in a depository in Philadelphia.
Upon final settlement of all controversies involved in the litigation there was
an application for the costs of maintaining such document depository which
ran into tens of thousands of dollars. How much utility the depository
actually served in view of the settlement is questionable; in event of trial on
the merits, however, the depository would surely have been useful.
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Under Statutes of Limitation. Fre-
quently, defendants will assert the statute of limitations to bar plaintiffs
from asserting causes of action accruing prior to four years before the
complaint was filed in an antitrust suit. The four-year limitations period was
enacted by Congress in 1955 and is set out in section 4(b) of the Clayton Act.
Opposition to the application of the statute of limitations is often phrased
under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment; the argument is that a wrong-
doer who has affirmatively acted to conceal a cause of action from an
injured party should not, as a matter of equity, be entitled to benefit from
such conduct by asserting the statute of limitations as a bar when the cause
of action has finally come to light.26' In the Beef Industry Antitrust Litiga-
tion plaintiffs argued that they did not know of their cause of action until a
favorable judgment was entered under section I of the Sherman Act in 1974
in Federal District Court in the Northern District of California.2 62 The order
of the trial court implied the existence of genuine issues of material fact:
first, concealment by defendants of plaintiffs' cause of action, and second-
ly, whether due diligence on the part of plaintiffs would have resulted in
discovery of their cause of action.
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Defendants in the Beef Industry
Antitrust Litigation filed such a motion based on the recent decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.2 6 3 Illinois Brick
Co. held that section 4 of the Clayton Act affords a remedy only to persons
who purchase directly from an antitrust offender, even though the brunt of
antitrust injuries may be passed on to indirect purchasers who are often the
ultimate consumers of a product. The majority opinion stated that because
259. FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
260. M.D.L. 56 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
261. Gaetzi v. Carling Brewing Co., 205 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Mich. 1962).
262. Bray v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Cal. 1975). Actually, settlement
was made by Safeway and Kroger, and the suit proceeded to trial and judgment was entered
only against the one defendant, The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc. The action
was brought by a number of cattlemen charging violations of antitrust laws in that the defend-
ants in combination with themselves and others conspired to regulate prices which plaintiff
cattlemen received for their beef.
263. 45 U.S.L.W. 4611 (U.S. June 7, 1977).
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Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 264 was found disposi-
tive under stare decisis, "[w]e do not address the standing issue, except to
note . . . that the question of which persons have been injured by an illegal
overcharge for purposes of section 4 is analytically distinct from the ques-
tion of which persons have sustained injuries too remote to give them
standing to sue for damages under Section 4." One dissent, however, made
significant references to standing, likening the concept of "target area" to
that of "proximate cause" in tort law, and finding liability of an antitrust
wrongdoer to anyone injured in the defendant's "chain of distribution.-2 65
XI. CONCLUSION
Most of the critical questions of federal procedure affecting antitrust
litigation are of a traditional nature and are well under control, with sound
judicial decisions clearly outlining the course for counsel to follow. In the
area of discovery and class actions, however, much further study is needed
and a sharpening of pre-trial requirements must be had to assure uniformity
of decision, sound administration, and justice.
264. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
265. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 45 U.S.L.W. 4611, 4618 (U.S. June 7, 1977) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Numerous other pre-trial motions are of course encountered in every complex
case, including motions to compel answers to interrogatories, motions for protective order,
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